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ABSTRACT 
This work develops and tests RCMOP-2, an extension of the Requirements-Driven, Cost-
Based, Manpower Optimization (RCMOP) model introduced by Clark.  Like its 
predecessor, RCMOP-2 simultaneously guides monthly values for U.S. Navy officer 
manpower variables, including inventory, promotions, accessions, designator transfers, 
and forced and natural losses, in order to minimize a “gap index” reflecting the lack of fit 
between a given personnel inventory and a set of billet requirements.  RCMOP-2 
enhances RCMOP with added resolution to input data and the inclusion of non-linear 
penalties for vacant billet requirements.  Specifically, RCMOP-2 details individual flow 
of personnel in Intelligence, Supply Corps, Civil Engineering and Other Restricted Line 
communities to avoid unsuited job assignments due to aggregation.  Also, by increasing 
the planning horizon from two to four years, RCMOP-2 can narrow the initial inventory 
shortfalls at lower ranks.  The utilization of non-linear penalties ensures a balanced 
dispersion of unfilled jobs across multiple billet categories, which is consistent with 
current practice. Finally, a comparison of several natural loss rate scenarios yields minor 
differences in our gap index and number of unfilled jobs, which indicates RCMOP-2 can 
accommodate specific loss information without severely impacting the outcome. 
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This research analyzes an extension of the Requirements-Driven, Cost-Based, 
Manpower Optimization (RCMOP) model introduced by LT David Clark at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School in 2009.  RCMOP is a linear optimization program that 
simultaneously guides monthly values for U.S. Navy officer manpower variables, 
including inventory, promotions, accessions, designator transfers, and forced and natural 
losses, over a two-year time horizon.  RCMOP minimizes the adverseness of fit between 
a given personnel inventory and a set of billet requirements, subject to fiscal and other 
manpower constraints.  Fit is measured in terms of a “gap index,” which employs linear 
penalties for unfilled billets.  In order to increase the fidelity of results, we revise 
RCMOP as RCMOP-2, which enhances its predecessor by employing non-linear 
penalties for billet vacancies, and by adding resolution to the input data, among others.   
Increased data resolution and extension of the planning horizon from two to four 
years significantly impacts the solution quality.  In particular, RCMOP’s uses a generic 
designator “Other” to aggregate officers in non-warfighting designators.  In RCMOP-2, 
this category has been divided into four individual communities (Intelligence, Supply 
Corps, Civil Engineering and Other Restricted Line), with the first three comprising 45% 
of the original.  Technically, this represents an important, realistic model restriction, 
because RCMOP has the potential to allocate some personnel in the “Other” community 
to jobs for which they are not actually qualified.  Despite this restriction, the additional 
two years of time horizon allow RCMOP-2 to reduce the overall gap to 4.04%, mainly 
due to the effective management of the flow of officers below the rank of lieutenant.  In 
other words, given the extended horizon, RCMOP-2 has visibility of, and capability to 
narrow, the initial inventory shortfalls at lower ranks.  Unfortunately, for higher ranks 
(lieutenant commander and above) RCMOP-2 can only manage the initial inventory, with 
limited opportunities for promotions.  We find that, in many instances, suggested 
promotion figures deviate from the actual limits prescribed by law.  This suggests 
assessing the effect of extending the planning time to 20 or 30 years, as well as explicitly 
enforcing promotion limits in the model.   
 xvi
Non-linear penalty functions, which we approximate as piece-wise linear 
functions, render better solutions than their linear counterparts in RCMOP.  For example, 
in the absence of sufficient manpower, RCMOP may sacrifice a disproportionate amount 
of 1000-coded billets if the (linear) weight for unfilled requirements in that category is 
smaller than for other jobs.  By introducing a varying (non-linear) weight, RCMOP-2 
disperses unfilled jobs across multiple billet categories more evenly, which is consistent 
with current practice.  
As a final exercise, we compare several natural loss rate scenarios.  (Natural 
losses, as opposed to forced losses or high-year tenure losses, are calculated as a fraction 
of the existing inventory, typically indexed by designator and years of commissioned 
service.)  The motivation for these excursions is apparent: natural losses are difficult to 
estimate accurately, and therefore are perceived as a key unknown affecting manpower 
plans.  Employing historical loss rates, we posit loss projections on observed rates similar 
to those in 2006-2008.  In our final range of scenarios, over four years, losses may 
deviate from our baseline scenario by a factor of 0.74 to 1.22, yielding relative 
differences in our gap index of less than 10%, with a slightly higher difference in the 
non-weighed number of unfilled jobs.  This suggests that RCMOP-2 is not very sensitive 
to natural loss rate changes, and can accommodate those changes without significantly 
impacting the outcome. 
RCMOP-2 also signals a need for an increase in OCS accessions by at least 25% 
(the increase limit imposed in RCMOP-2) with respect to current plans.  These additional 
accessions allow the model to leverage ensigns in order to reduce penalties for jobs up to 
lieutenant ranks. 
We also find that the available budget never becomes a binding constraint, and 
yearly costs remains at approximately 10% below budget.  Finally, RCMOP-2 unveils 
some end-effect consequences, especially in unusual increases in forced losses in the last 
months of our four-year horizon.  This suggests pursuing the abovementioned time 
horizon extension as a future step in improving RCMOP-2. 
 xvii
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The Department of Defense (DoD) utilizes the Planning, Programming, 
Budgeting, and Execution System as both policy and program to manage its resources, 
simultaneously considering near-, intermediate-, and long-term objectives.  The 
Department of the Navy (DoN) mirrors the DoD process.  One key element of this 
process is the biannual submission of the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) by 
the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to the Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) on even 
years.  The POM estimates resources required by DoN to meet national strategic 
objectives over the next six years.  The nearest two years contain significantly more 
detail than the following four years of estimates. 
The DoN budget contains three major cost categories: military personnel, 
operations and maintenance, and investments (e.g., basic pay for sailors, aircraft fuel, and 
ships, respectively).  This budget is premised on peacetime operations.  Any increase in 
operations, also increases the Navy’s fiscal requirements, which are authorized by 
Congress in the form of supplemental appropriations for overseas contingency operations 
(OCO).  The costs of these three major DoN budget areas have risen steadily over the 
past few fiscal years (FYs), while OCO appropriations have declined over the same 










Military Personnel  38.0 39.6 41.5 44.3
Operations and Maintenance 37.3 40.4 41.3 43.0
Investments 51.9 59.5 63.9 69.1
Supplemental Appropriations 24.5 25.7 7.3 -
OCO Request - - 8.7 15.3
DoN Total Budget  151.7 164.8 163.8 171.7
Table 1.   DoN Budget Trends, FY 2007–10 (Dollars in Billions).  [Office of the 
Budget 2009] 
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Mounting external and internal fiscal pressures in recent years compelled Navy 
leadership to adopt a more business-like approach to naval affairs. Navy Enterprise is the 
organizational construct designed to improve efficient use of resources.  While Navy 
Enterprise focuses on the highest levels of leadership in the Navy (including SECNAV 
and CNO), the bulk of the organization resides in a smaller subset: Fleet Readiness 
Enterprise (FRE), which includes individual warfare enterprises and providers. Individual 
warfare enterprises are: Naval Aviation Enterprise, Surface Warfare Enterprise, Undersea 
Enterprise, Naval Netwar/FORCEnet Enterprise, and Naval Expeditionary Combat 
Enterprise.  Enterprises and providers work cooperatively to best employ current and 
planned Navy resources in execution of the National Maritime Strategy.  FRE owns the 
“alignment and process for delivering ready forces for tasking.”  Providers deliver future 
capability and readiness to individual warfare enterprises at optimal cost [Navy 
Enterprise 2008].  Figure 1 illustrates relationships necessary to balance current versus 
future readiness of the Navy.  Specifically, manpower, personnel, training, and education 
(MPT&E) is one such provider within FRE, and the Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP) 
bears the responsibility of ensuring the Navy’s MPT&E needs are met across the 
spectrum of warfare enterprises. 
 
Figure 1.   FRE within Navy Enterprise.  [Navy Enterprise 2008] 
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It [Navy Enterprise] is about collaborating, sharing, and enhancing our 
business practices. Not to turn the Navy into a business, but to understand 
the business of the Navy so that we remain the most effective and efficient 
Navy in the world. [Roughead, March 2008] 
Additionally, CNP is responsible for meeting fiscal limitations specified in the 
congressionally approved budget.  Herein lies the first challenge: Balancing the end 
strength personnel desired by each individual warfare enterprises while meeting fiscal 
requirements for any given budget year.  When multiple fiscal years are considered, the 
second challenge becomes apparent:  Managing Navy manpower to support both current 
needs and long-term force stability (in terms of both end strength and cost), and 
capability to support future requirements. 
The costs for military personnel managed by CNP are a significant part of the 
DoN budget.  Historically, manpower costs have remained nearly 25% of the total DoN 
budget in recent years.  Planned expenditures for military personnel, Navy (MPN) 
exceeded $23 billion in each of the last three FYs, and proposed expenditures for FY 
2010 exceed $24.5 billion (Table 2).  Note:  Table 1 includes manpower costs associated 
with U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps military personnel.  Table 2 includes only costs 









Pay and Allowances of Officers 6,000   6,200  6,458   6,938 
Pay and Allowances of Enlisted 15,370 15,322 15,747  15,506 
Pay and Allowances of Midshipmen  63  61  63   70 
Subsistence of Enlisted Personnel  908  902  950   1,039 
Permanent Change of Station Travel  719  723  663   772 
Other Military Personnel Costs  125  111  156   178 
Total: MPN $23,185 $23,318 $24,038  $24,504 
Table 2.   Planned MPN Spending for Active Duty Navy Personnel (Dollars in 
Millions).  [Office of the Budget 2007−2009] 
Annually, the CNO provides guidance on his vision for the Navy.  Balancing 
effectiveness, efficiency, and risk has been an underlying theme over recent years 
[Roughead 2007−2009].  This research explores the use of mathematical optimization to 
 4
plan and apportion Navy manpower.  These efforts are consistent with ongoing CNO 
guidance and the MPT&E effort across individual warfare enterprises. 
B. OVERVIEW OF NAVAL OFFICER MANPOWER PLANNING 
The distinction between officer and enlisted personnel is the broadest 
classification of personnel within the U.S. military, including the U.S. Navy.  Both 
categories have distinct characteristics such as inventory levels, loss rates, career fields, 
and associated career paths.  Historically, officer ranks possess smaller inventories that 
exhibit more stability with regard to other characteristics than enlisted personnel.  Officer 
ranks are the focus for this research. The critical elements that drive the manpower 
planning process are work requirements, fiscal limitations, budget programming, end 
strength, billet authorizations, and succession planning, as described in the remainder of 
this section. 
1. Work Requirements 
Work requirements for Navy officers are, in essence, the specific jobs and tasks 
necessary to achieve the Navy’s mission.  This mission is shaped through guidance from 
several sources:  the National Security Strategy, National Defense Strategy, and National 
Military Strategy [Brown 2009].  These strategic documents provide a framework in 
which the National Maritime Strategy must fit, and a context for leaders within FRE to 
make decisions.  Individual warfare enterprises interpret strategic goals and quantify 
needs to accomplish these objectives.  Needs are quantified in several dimensions, 
including force structure and manpower (e.g., types and number of ships, and personnel 
to operate them).  The Naval Manpower Analysis Center is heavily involved in 
manpower requirements estimates across the various warfare enterprises.  The process of 
developing work requirements considers neither fiscal constraints nor end strength 
limitations, and represents unbounded work requirements.   
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2. Fiscal Constraints and Budget Programming 
The Navy budget is discretionary spending within the U.S. federal budget, and is 
approved annually by the Congress.  This congressional appropriation is an upper bound 
on spending.  Table 2 shows authorized expenditures for pay and allowances of active 
Navy officers in FYs 2007-10. 
Over time, projected manpower needs become current manpower needs.  Budget 
programming expresses the expected manning levels in dollars rather than in terms of 
people or man-hours.  The budget program office compares the cost of manning plans to 
the estimates of available fiscal resources.  This comparison provides insight into the 
affordability of a proposed manpower plan.  While cost is a significant factor, the “best” 
manpower plan is not always the least costly.  A viable manpower strategy is published 
biannually on even years as part of the POM, and adjusted on odd years during the 
Program Review (PR). 
3. End Strength 
Yardley et al. [2005] give a comprehensive outline of various laws and policies 
governing military personnel.  In particular, they highlight applicable mandates by the 
U.S. Congress.  U.S. Code, Title 10 Section 115 allows Congress to set personnel 
strength levels (known as “end strength”) for each FY.  Sections 521 and 523 of that 
Code are also noteworthy: Section 521 requires the Secretary of Defense to set strength 
levels for active duty officers above the rank of chief warrant officer at the end of each 
FY; and, Section 523 controls distribution of officers in ranks of lieutenant commander, 
commander, and captain (O4, O5, and O6 respectively), effectively placing an upper limit 
on the number of officers in each of these grades.   
4. Billet Authorization 
Billet authorization within the Navy is the process wherein decisions are made on 
which work requirements will be funded, given the current fiscal and end-strength 
limitations.  Historically, the Navy’s manpower budget has been slightly less than the 
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cost of its work requirements.  This shortfall forces resource sponsors (e.g., Navy 
Enterprise providers) and individual warfare enterprises to seek efficiencies within their 
organizations, and also fosters competition for billet funding among these groups. 
5. Succession Planning 
The Navy is fundamentally a hierarchical organization that promotes from within 
its ranks.  Usually, an O6 within the Navy has served in every subordinate officer rank 
over a career that spans decades.  Consequently, there is a flow of personnel from junior 
to senior ranks.  Manpower planners manage this natural movement of personnel through 
the ranks, seeking to maintain appropriate personnel levels, skills sets, and promotion 
opportunities that meet both current and projected needs.  Personnel loss rates, new 
officer accessions, promotions, and training of new and existing officers are all 
significant factors in succession planning. 
C. RECENT PRACTICES AND RELEVANT ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
Clark [2009] (and references therein) provides a sound review of recent trends in 
manpower planning and budget programming within the Navy.  He further provides a 
comprehensive summary of germane literature for this research, which is partially 
brought into this document for completion.  We briefly outline Clark’s thoughts on 
current practice and then summarize selected academic efforts not previously discussed.   
1. Recent Applications 
Clark acknowledges an aversion to optimization models by both Navy planners 
and decision-makers.  Dominant tools used by manpower planners include: (1) Markov-
chain transition rates embedded with spreadsheet models, and (2) probabilistic based 
simulation models.  Ease of use, modification and interpretation of these models may 
make them preferred over optimization models.     
Budget planning practices have also evolved.  A simplified explanation of a 
recent methodology is as follows:  Estimate the cost per lieutenant from the current 
budget, multiply this cost by the desired number of lieutenants in a future FY and adjust 
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for expected inflation.  This approach has been superseded with a method that leverages 
the structure of FRE.  Individual warfare enterprises outline current and future force 
requirements utilizing a “bottom-up” approach.  This technique essentially entails 
detailing costs associated with each requirement.  Aggregating these smaller costs 
provides a more credible cost estimate for today’s force as well as that of the future 
Navy. 
Current manpower and budget practices identify personnel shortfalls and 
excesses.  In essence, they provide a binary response:  accept or reject the given plan.  
These tools are descriptive; therefore, they lack any capability to manipulate the 
shortfalls and excesses in any given plan to produce a better one.  Insight on how to 
leverage shortfalls and surpluses may: (1) further improve an accepted plan, (2) improve 
a rejected plan to a degree that it becomes accepted, or (3) identify a rejected plan as the 
closest to acceptable. 
2. Associated Literature 
Edwards [1983] provides a general overview of manpower models, focusing on 
their application and underlying assumptions.  He discusses the concept of a “manpower 
gap” as the disparity between supply and demand for manpower.  We will build on this 
concept later in this document.  Edwards generalizes promotion systems as “push” or 
“pull” asserting that “push” systems are well suited for Markov chain models, while 
“pull” systems lend themselves to renewal models.  He notes that few promotion schemes 
are purely “push” or “pull,” but a blend of the two.  Supplementing this reading with 
Gass [1991] provides a concise view of modeling techniques available to military 
manpower planners in the late 1980s and during the 1990s. 
Durso and Donahue [1995] report on the role of optimization in the 
demobilization and strength reductions of the U.S. Army during the early 1990s.  Their 
model characterizes Army personnel as a generalized network, and subsequently uses 




operating strength.  In conjunction with Holz and Wroth [1980], there is a nearly 20-year 
history of the Army’s use of linear programming as a significant tool in manpower 
management. 
Tivnan [1998] examines optimal allocation of enlisted Marines to jobs in a 
bipartite elastic network, seeking to improve the existing assignment model used by the 
U.S. Marine Corps.  His work allows personnel assignments to a job requirement of equal 
rank and one rank above or below the individual’s rank (e.g., a person with rank E5 could 
be assigned to an E4, E5, or E6 job).  This “one-up, one-down” concept is employed 
within the Navy today.  Tivnan’s work and earlier research by Morben [1989] are the 
only prior works we have discovered that address “one-up, one-down” assignment of 
personnel to jobs.  Tivnan states that the U.S. Marine Corps’ assignment model “has been 
in use since the 1970s,” tallying a second service with at least 20 years of reliance on 
optimization as a manpower planning tool.  Citing separate sources from Clark, Tivnan 
also portrays the Navy as reluctant to apply optimization-based tools to manpower 
problems.  
D. THESIS OBJECTIVES AND ORGANIZATION 
Current U.S. Navy manpower planning methods highlight problems such as 
unacceptable manning levels at certain ranks or time periods where manning levels and 
budget outlays do not support each other.  Leveraging an optimal solution of U.S. Navy 
officer manning with fiscal constraints should either:  (1) Increase percentage of 
requirements met for a fixed cost, or (2) meet a fixed requirement for a reduced cost.  
Either outcome represents an increased return on investment, across the full spectrum of 
Navy enterprises.   
This work analyzes an extension of the Requirements-Driven Cost-Based 
Manpower Optimization (RCMOP) model developed by Clark [2009].  The extension, 
referred to as RCMOP-2, includes an approximation of non-linear penalties for unfilled 
manning requirements and other refinements.  Specifically, this research exercises 
RCMOP-2 under varying conditions, and examines: 
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• The potential improvement by adding more resolution to the model and 
data.  This includes grouping personnel into nine categories and 
examining work requirements in ten categories. The original model used 
five and six groups, respectively. Time horizon is also doubled from two 
to four years. 
• The impacts of different non-linear penalty functions (approximated as 
piece-wise linear functions) for unfilled manning requirements. 
• The sensitivity of model to personnel loss rate parameters. 
In addition, we describe the development of a semi-automated tool to fuse 
multiple model output files from any single run and synthesize this information into 
customized graphical reports that help expedite analysis across multiple model runs. 
As with the predecessor model, there is not an immediate expectation of a ready-
for-use model, but improvements in RCMOP-2 increase the potential use of optimization, 
in conjunction with other methodologies, in addressing Navy manpower issues. 
The remainder of this document is organized as follows:  Chapter II presents the 
revised RCMOP model, to include the assumptions and mathematical formulation.  
Chapter III addresses the flow of information into and out of our model.  In Chapter IV, 
we carry out three comparisons:  the original and revised RCMOP models; various 
scenarios with linear and non-linear penalty rates; and, several cases of varying personnel 
loss rates.  Chapter V summarizes significant findings, and suggests directions for future 
research. 
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II. THE REVISED REQUIREMENTS-DRIVEN COST-BASED 
MANPOWER OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
This chapter describes the revised RCMOP optimization model (see Salmerón 
[2010]), henceforth referred to as RCMOP-2.  We discuss its underlying architecture, 
modeling assumptions, and mathematical formulation.  Like its predecessor, RCMOP-2 
measures the “fit” of officer personnel (supply) against given manpower requirements 
(demand) and seeks to minimize the inadequacy of this “fit.”  Following Clark [2009], we 
refer to this measure of fitness as the “gap index,” and define it formally later in this 
chapter.  The model uses a monthly time step to adequately depict the relationships 
between input data and output variables in the context of an annual budget over a four-
year time horizon. 
A. PERSONNEL FLOW DESIGN 
Over time, Navy officers move through ranks and between designators in distinct 
ways, which can be viewed as flow (of personnel) in a time-phased network [Ahuja et al., 
1993, pp. 737–40].  This flow remains a cornerstone of the RCMOP-2 model.  Other side 
constraints, however, preclude us from solving RCMOP-2 as a network.  Given that 
computational times for the scenarios analyzed in this thesis remain manageable, we have 
not explored the potential application of decomposition algorithms that take advantage of 
the partial network structure in the formulation. 
Many manpower practices within the Navy use personnel data collected at a 
single point in time, and subsequent time series analysis projects those data into the 
future.  In a similar fashion, RCMOP-2 counts officers in certain groups on the first day 
of each month, categorizing them by rank, designator, and years of commissioned service 
(YCS).  We then use data and variables to adjust inventory levels over a given month, 
which in turn becomes the next month’s inventory.  Consider the population inventory of 
a specific rank r and designator d with y YCS in a given month t.  The following month’s 
(t + 1’s) inventory is derived from the previous month’s inventory adjusted by the gains 
and losses during month t.  Figure 2 illustrates this concept.  Gains and losses can be 
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characterized in several ways, and Table 3 details those used in RCMOP-2 divided into 
three general categories:  losses, gains, and exchanges. 
 
Figure 2.   Inventory balance of flow concept. 
  Description (RCMOP-2 notation) Role in RCMOP-2 
Natural losses (NLOSS) Decision Variable 





High-Year tenure (HYT) Decision Variable 
Accessions from the U.S. Naval 
Academy and Reserve Officers 






Accession from other sources such as 
Officer Candidate School 
(ACCESSOCS) 
Decision Variable 
Promotion (PROM) Decision Variable 






Promotion and Transfer (PROMTRF) Decision Variable 
Table 3.   Categorical personnel movements in RCMOP-2. 
Losses represent personnel leaving the Navy and reduce strength, while gains 
increase inventory through new officers beginning their naval service.  The third 
category, exchanges, denotes personnel movements between ranks and/or designators.  
An exchange is simultaneously a loss and a gain that results in zero net change to Navy-
wide end-strength numbers.  Promotions are an example of exchanges: an individual is 
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promoted out of one rank (loss) and into a new rank (gain), but the officer was in the 
Navy before and after the promotion, leaving Navy-wide inventory unchanged. 
Of course, RCMOP-2 allows only certain types of gains and losses.  For example, 
a promotion to certain ranks at certain YCS is explicitly disallowed to comply with 
Navy’s regulation.  Also, other constraints on the values for decision variables are 
applicable, as described later in this chapter. 
B. MODELING ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Rank, Designator, and Work Requirements 
RCMOP-2 maintains its primary focus on naval officers from the rank of ensign 
(O1) through captain (O6) who account for nearly 97% of inventory [Office of the 
Budget, 2010].  Consistent with the previous assumptions made by Clark [2009], warrant 
officer and admiral ranks remain excluded from the RCMOP-2 model, due to their 
smaller sizes and less regular promotions when compared to other ranks.   
There are dozens of unique billet and officer designators listed in the Manual of 
Navy Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications (NOC) [Director, MPT&E Policy 
2009].  Billet designators are used to describe work requirements, and officer designators 
characterize the professional expertise of individuals.  The billet and officer designators 
aid in matching people with appropriate jobs.  For modeling purposes, we aggregate both 
the jobs and personnel designators into related groups (Table 4) and assign which 
designators are “eligible” to perform analogous jobs (Figure 3). 
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Table 4.    Summary and description of designators and work requirement 
categories. 
 
Figure 3.   Mapping of possible personnel to job assignments. (Abbreviations listed in 
Table 4.) 
This aggregation may neglect nuanced details of billet and officer designators 
listed in the NOC.  For example, billets coded 1000 and 1050 are contained in our 
j1000 category.  In actuality, personnel in our AVIAT, SPEC, SUB, SWO, URL-
OTHER, INTEL, and RL-OTHER categories may be assigned to 1000-coded billets, 
Description Designator Abbreviation 
Work 
Requirement 
Naval aviators AVIAT jAVIAT 
Special warfare and operations officers SPEC jSPEC 
Submarine warfare officers SUB jSUB 
Surface warfare officers SWO jSWO 
All other unrestricted line officers URL-OTHER jURL-OTHER 
Intelligence officers INTEL jINTEL 
All other restricted line officers RL-OTHER jRL-OTHER 
Supply Corps officers SUPPLY jSUPPLY 
Civil Engineering Corps officers CEC jCEC 
General purpose billets (e.g., those coded 
1000, 1020 and 1050) 
N/A j1000 
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while 1050-coded billets are open only to personnel in our AVIAT, SPEC, SUB, and 
SWO groups and must be above the rank of O3. 
The uncertainty regarding promotion timing and frequency also scopes our 
designator choices.  Various laws, directives and policies permit certain officer 
communities to receive constructive credit for professional experience prior to entering 
the Navy, allowing accessions at the ranks other than O1 [Yardley 2005].  These groups 
largely comprise the Navy’s Staff Corps officers many of which are modeled separately 
from other officer populations by manpower planners.  Officer communities excluded 
from RCMOP-2 are Medical, Medical Service, Dental, Nurse, Chaplain, and Judge 
Advocate General Corps, each of which contains several designators. 
2. Years of Service and Years of Commissioned Service 
The Navy measures officer longevity in two distinct ways:  years of service 
(YOS) and YCS.  YOS measures the total time a member has spent in the Navy and YCS 
reflects the length of time served as an officer.  YOS and YCS are the same for the 
majority of officers, but officers with any prior enlisted service have YOS greater than 
their YCS.  However, for the purposes of this research, YOS and YCS are assumed to be 
identical and used interchangeably.  The most important implication of this simplification 
is that RCMOP-2 will slightly underestimate the cost of those officers with YOS greater 
than their YCS.  Based on this assumption, limited duty officers (who must have prior 
service) are excluded from the RCMOP-2 model due to the significant differential 
between their YCS and YOS. Efforts to characterize the relationships between YOS and 
YCS for prior service officers within our aggregated communities is ongoing, but was not 
completed during the time of this research. 
A second simplification in this area involves the advancement of YCS.  Every 
year, on the anniversary of their commissioning, officers earn credit for an additional 
YCS.  The complexity of both our model and data makes tracking this anniversary for 
each individual untenable.  Therefore, we assume that the officer population gains an 
additional year of service on May 1 of every year.  This captures the majority of officers 
accessed from the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) and the Naval Reserve Officers 
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Training Corps (NROTC) who are commissioned in May.  However, certain officers, 
such as Officer Candidate School (OCS) graduates, might not be advanced accurately 
under this assumption.  Intuitively, the early and late advancements should be roughly 
equal and offset each other, though this assertion has not been formally validated. 
3. Lateral Transfers 
Naval officers may request to transfer into another officer community, thereby 
changing their officer designator.  Lateral transfers are based on personnel desires, 
community needs (i.e., both the gaining and losing community must permit a transfer), 
and personnel availability.  It is possible for officers to transfer between most 
communities, but in practice, lateral transfers are normally from the unrestricted line 
(URL) communities (e.g., our AVIAT, SPEC, SUB, and SWO groups) into non-
URL communities (e.g., our INTEL, RL-OTHER, SUPPLY, and CEC categories).  
For the purposes of RCMOP-2, we assume that URL officers serving in a warfare 
community may move laterally to non-URL communities (Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4.   Mapping of possible lateral transfers. 
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4. Promotions, Promotion Zones, and High Year Tenure 
 Clark’s discussion on Federal law, DoD directives, and DoN policies regarding 
promotions and high-year tenure (HYT) is still current.  Promotions should occur within 
specified YCS windows, and the fraction of eligible officers who are promoted must fall 
within minimum and maximum percentages established by law.  HYT forces officers 
who have failed to promote out of the Navy.  These values vary by rank, as specified in 
Table 5. 
Rank YCS YCS for Promotion  (to rank) 




O6 21-29 21-23 40-60% 30 
O5 15-27 15-17 60-80% 28 
O4 9-19 9-11 70-90% 20 
O3 4-11 4 100% 12 
O2 2-3 2 100% NA 
O1 0-1 NA NA NA 
Table 5.   Summary table of YCS, promotion, and HYT values by rank. [Yardley 
et al., 2005] 
RCMOP-2 does not constrain promotion rates to allow the model greater 
flexibility, which may signal needs for change in policy.  The model may promote 
eligible officers (at a rate higher than allowed under current guidance) to mitigate the 
negative impact of job vacancies.  Similarly, RCMOP-2 does not consider separate 
promotion zones within each promotion window, though, in actuality, below zone (or 
“early”) promotions are limited to a maximum of 10% [Yardley et al., 2005]. 
5. Losses 
In addition to HYT losses, RCMOP-2 also considers two other types of losses, 
namely natural losses and forced losses.  Natural losses represent the recurring fraction of 
officers who do not continue their service for a variety of reasons: voluntary retirement 
(as opposed to forced retirement due to HYT), pursuing a civilian career following 
obligated service, disciplinary losses, and being found medically unfit for further duty.  
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Natural losses by designator and YCS are assumed to be a predetermined percentage of 
corresponding inventories.  We further detail specific loss values used for our baseline 
scenario in Section III.A, and for other excursions in Section IV.C. 
Forced losses denote a decision by Navy leadership to compel or influence 
personnel to leave the Navy, despite being qualified to remain on active duty.  The 
significant end strength reduction in military personnel during the early 1990s provides 
several examples of forced losses.  RCMOP-2 considers forced losses as a decision 
variable, which signals time periods when specific ranks and designators contain excess 
personnel. 
6. Personnel Assignment and Requirements Matching 
RCMOP-2 seeks to find the best “fit” of personnel inventory to work 
requirements over a four year time period.  It is important to note that our model does not 
make individual personnel assignments, as considered by Tivnan [1998].  The process of 
detailing individuals to unique billets is a challenging and separate problem.  RCMOP-2 
recommends monthly allocation of aggregated quantities of personnel in a given rank and 
designator to a job type and rank, allowing a limited number of personnel to perform jobs 
requiring one rank above or below their actual rank.  
C. WEIGHING LINEAR AND NON-LINEAR PENALTY FUNCTIONS 
In both RCMOP and RCMOP-2, work requirements are assigned weights (wj) 
indicating the relative importance of a specific job type.  Higher weights indicate work 
requirements that, if left vacant, may have a more significant impact on the Navy’s 
execution of its maritime strategy.  In RCMOP, penalties are strictly linear, meaning that 
for a given weight, the penalty for not filling the first job is the same as the penalty for 
not filling the, say, hundredth or thousandth job.  On the other hand, in RCMOP-2, we 
implement a non-linear, convex penalty function [Salmerón 2010].   
RCMOP-2’s non-linear penalty is built by partitioning each work requirement 
into several population segments (or tiers).  As billets are not being filled, the population 
segment is noted and the penalty for that tier is assessed.  As more billets remain unfilled, 
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they move into subsequent tiers that have higher penalty rates. Tiers can be based, for 
example, on both the weight of the billet and percentage of that billet type that is unfilled.  
A comparison of percentage of the assessed penalty by fraction of the work requirement 
for linear and non-linear penalty functions is shown in Figure 5 (for a case with five 
tiers). 
 
Figure 5.   Percentage of penalty and population for linear and non-linear penalty 
functions. 
Clark additionally notes that in RCMOP, all other things being equal, if weights 
between two jobs are not identical, the job with lesser weight always remains at a smaller 
penalty rate and is preferentially used to fill j1000 billets, transfers, etc.  This preferential 
selection, results in lesser weight jobs bearing a disproportionate amount of the total 
penalty.  Implementing a non-linear penalty helps distribute the unmet requirements more 
evenly between different job types.  For example, consider requirements for Job A and 
Job B with weights of 75 and 100, respectively, with both billet types separated into five 
population tiers in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Non-linear penalties associated with different weights. 
RCMOP-2 would initially prefer Job A’s penalty (75) to Job B’s penalty (100), 
until the first 10% of Job A billets had been used.  At that point, Job B’s penalty becomes 
preferred, since Job A’s penalty is now increased to its next level of 150.  This process 
repeats where a given job is preferred over the other until the given job reaches a tier that 
exceeds the current penalty of the other job. 
D. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION OF THE REVISED 
REQUIREMENTS-DRIVEN COST-BASED MANPOWER 
OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
This section specifies the mathematical formulation of the RCMOP-2 model, and 
follows both Clark [2009] and Salmerón [2010]. 
1. Notation 
Indices and Sets 
r R∈  Officer Rank: O1, O2, O3, O4, O5, O6 
d D∈  Designator: URL-OTHER, SWO, SUB, AVIAT, SPEC, 
INTEL, RL-OTHER, SUPPLY, CEC 
j J∈  Job: jURL-OTHER, jSWO, jSUB, jAVIAT, jSPEC, 
j1000, jINTEL, jRL-OTHER, jSUPPLY, jCEC 
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y Y∈  Year Commissioned Service:  y0, y1,…, y29, y30 
t T∈  Planning Month: e.g., Oct08, …, Sep12, Oct12 
f F∈  Fiscal Year: e.g., FY2009, …, FY2013 
k K∈  Segment (a.k.a., bracket or tier) for non-linear penalty: 
e.g., k1, …, k5 
RY  Subset of (r,y) pairs where it is possible that an officer 
with rank r has y YCS. 
RY ′  Extended subset of (r,y) pairs including the next-to-
feasible YCS y for rank r: 
⎧ ⎫= ∪ ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭
(O1,y2),(02,y4),(03,y12),' (04,y20),(05,y28),(06,y30)RY RY  
HRY  Subset of (r,y) pairs where an officer of rank r and 
YCS y reaches HYT (see Table 5). 
PRY  Subset of (r,y) pairs where officers can be promoted to 
the next rank r in YCS y (see Table 5). 
FRR  Subset of (r,r’) pairs where officers of rank r can fill 
work requirements in rank r’, i.e., 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
O1,O1 , O1,O2 , O2,O1 , O2,O2 , O2,O3 ,
O3,O2 , O3,O3 , O3,O4 , O4,O3 , O4,O4 ,
O4,O5 , O5,O4 , O5,O5 , O5,O6 , O6,O5 , O6,
 
DJ  Subset of (d,j) pairs where an officer with designator d 
can fill a requirement in job field j (see Figure 3). 
DD  Subset of (d,d’) pairs where an officer with designator 
d can be transferred to designator d’ (see Figure 4) 
FT  Subset of (f,t) pairs where month t is in fiscal year f. 
T ′  Subset of months where YCS advancement occurs, i.e. 




, , ,r d y taccessNAROTC
 
The projected number of new officers accessed from 
USNA and NROTC sources into rank r and designator d 
with years of service y during month t.  [persons] 
, , ,r d y taccessOCS  The projected number of new officers accessed from 
OCS into rank r and designator d with years of service y 
during month t.  [persons] 
minOCS, maxOCS The minimum and maximum fraction, respectively, of 
the projected OCS accessions, used to bound OCS 
accessions as determined by RCMOP.  [fraction] 
, ,r j treq  The work requirement for officers of rank r and field j at 
the start of month t. [persons] 
fbudget  Total dollars available to fund the model-specific officer 
manpower for the fiscal year f.  [$] 
, ,costr y t  The monthly cost of an officer in rank r and YCS y at 
the start of month t.  [$] 
α ,d y  The monthly loss factor for officers with designator d 
and YCS y.  [fraction] 
, ,0r d yinvent  The initial inventory of officers present on the first day 
of the first month with rank r, designator d, and YSC y. 
[persons] 
jw  The baseline weight (penalty) assigned to a shortfall 
within job field j.  [penalty units] 
Note: Larger penalties are associated with higher 
priority work requirements. 
kl  
Maximum fraction of unfulfilled jobs within bracket k.  
[fraction] 
Note: It is required that =∑ 1.0kk l  
γk Penalty coefficient for each unfulfilled job in bracket k, 
satisfying: 1 2 ... Kγ γ γ< < <  [scalar]  
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β ,r d  The minimum fraction of officers with rank r and 
designator d that must fill work requirement of identical 
rank r (e.g., 95% of SWO O2 personnel must be 
assigned to an O2 billet).  [fraction] 
η ,r j  The maximum fraction of the total job requirement j and 
rank r that can be left unfilled.  [fraction] 
 
Derived Data [units] 
w  Maximum possible penalty; occurs when every work 
requirement remains vacant.  [penalty units × persons] 
Defined as:  
, ,
k j k rjt
r j t k
w w l reqγ= ∑ ∑  (1) 




, , ,r d y tINVENT  The number of officers present on the first day of month 
t with rank r, designator d, and YCS y. [persons] 
, , ,r d y tACCESSOCS  The number of new officers accessed from OCS into 
rank r and designator d with YCS y during month t. 
[persons] 
, , ,r d y tPROM  The number of officers with designator d that are 
promoted into rank r, at the beginning of month t and 
with y YCS. [persons] 
, , , ,r d d y tTRF ′  The number of officers with rank r that are transferred 
from designator d into designator d’, at the beginning of 
month t and with y YCS. [persons] 
, , , ,r d d y tPROMTRF ′  The number of officers that are promoted and 
transferred from designator d into rank r and designator 
d', at the beginning of month t and with y YCS. 
[persons] 
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, , ,r d y tNLOSS  The number of natural officer losses from rank r, 
designator d, and YCS y during month t. [persons] 
, , ,r d y tFLOSS  The number of forced officer losses from rank r, 
designator d, and YCS y during month t. [persons] 
, , ,r d y tHYT  The number of HYT officer losses from rank r, 
designator d, that would enter y YCS during month t. 
[persons] 
′, , , ,r r d j tFILL  The number of officers in designator d with rank r that 
fill a work requirement in job field j and rank r' at the 
start of month t. [persons] 
, , ,r j t kKDEFICIT  The shortage of officers needed to fill a given 
requirement in rank r and job field j at the beginning of 
month t within penalty bracket k [persons] 
, ,r j tSURPLUS  The excess of officers filling a given requirement in rank 
r and job field j at the beginning of month t. [persons] 
2. Formulation 
Objective Function: 
γ∑ , , ,
, , ,
1min k j r j t k
r j t k
w KDEFICIT
w
      (2) 
Subject to: 
Inventory Initialization: 
= ∀ ∈ =, , , , , 10 , , , |( , ) ',r d y t r d yINVENT invent r d y t r y RY t t   (3) 
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Fill and Requirements Constraints: 
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β
∈ ∈
≥ ∀∑ ∑, , , , , , , ,
|( , ) |( , )
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≤ ∀, , , , , ,minOCS , , ,r d y t r d y taccessOCS ACCESSOCS r d y t  (13) 
≤ ∀, , , , , ,maxOCS , , ,r d y t r d y tACCESSOCS accessOCS r d y t  (14) 
 
Exclusions: 
=, , , 0r d y tINVENT    ∀ ∉, , , |( , )r d y t r y RY   (15) 
=, , , 0r d y tHYT     ∀ ∉, , , |( , ) Hr d y t r y RY   (16) 
=, , , 0r d y tPROM    ∀ ∉, , , |( , ) Pr d y t r y RY   (17) 
=, , , 0r d y tPROMTRF    ∀ ∉, , , |( , ) Pr d y t r y RY   (18) 
 
Variable domains: 
All variables are non-negative 
3. Formulation Description 
The objective function (2) of the RCMOP-2 model minimizes the total weighted 
gap index associated with the differences between personnel inventory and work 
requirements across fractional segments of the population over the model’s time horizon.  
The objective function has been normalized to the interval [0, 1].  We calculate the 
maximum possible penalty (in which every job in the Navy remains unfilled), as derived 
data detailed in (1).  If all jobs were left vacant our objective function would yield a value 
of 1.  Conversely, if all requirements are met (i.e., all deficits are 0), then our objective 
function would have a value of 0.   
Inventory is initialized in (3), and establishes the personnel supply available in 
October 2008.  We then apply (4-5) to maintain the proper flow of personnel through 
ranks, designators, and YCS over time, conceptually illustrated in Figure 2, with specific 
personnel transactions detailed in Table 3.  Note that (4) does not apply to either the first 
month of study (October 2008) or when a YCS increase occurs (May of any year).  For 
the latter, a similar balance of flow (5) ensures a YCS increment for all personnel. 
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The FILL variables ensure that the entire inventory is utilized to meet specified 
job requirements in constraints (6-7) and are further discussed in Section IV.A.  We 
report the excess and shortage of personnel inventory through the use of the KDEFICIT 
and SURPLUS variables.  KDEFICIT describes magnitude of a shortfall within a specific 
bracket of a requirement and is bounded in (8) such that we cannot see a shortage in a 
bracket that exceeds the bracket’s size.  (9) ensures that a minimum fraction of a given 
rank’s inventory (by designator) is allocated to perform jobs within the same rank, every 
month.  Equation (10) constrains the fraction of the total deficit for each rank and job 
type, although we set this value to one in all of our scenarios, so that no requirement is 
enforced as a hard constraint. 
Equation (11) calculates the monthly natural loss during the planning period.  
Validation of the fiduciary integrity of our manpower expenditures occurs in Equation 
(12).  RCMOP-2 is afforded some limited deviations from planned OCS accessions, as 
outlined in (13-14).  Equations (15-18) are logical constraints and preclude unauthorized 
pairings of certain variables. 
 
 28
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 29
III. INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ARCHITECTURE 
This chapter describes inputs into RCMOP-2 and the subsequent synthesis of 
outputs into valuable information for Navy planners.  Figure 7 illustrates the architecture 
guiding the flow of information, whose details are provided in the remainder of this 
chapter. 
 
Figure 7.   Information flow architecture. 
A. RCMOP INPUTS 
As seen in Figure 7, there are two types of inputs into our model: input files and 
other inputs.  Each type is addressed in turn, outlining relevant data sources. 
1. Losses 
Three input files relate to α ,d y (our monthly loss factor): baseline loss rates, 
modifications to our baseline loss rates, and bounds on our loss rates. 
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We consider causes for “natural” losses identical to Clark [2009], and draw our 
loss values from the Officer Personnel Information System Data Mart via the Highlander 
web-based interface [Peak Software, 2009].  Specifically, our loss rates are derived from 
FYs 2006-08, in an effort to capture trends in recent history and have a sufficient quantity 
of historical data.  FY 2009 data has not been used (despite recent availability) to 
facilitate comparison of RCMOP-2 and RCMOP as tested by Clark. 
Rank is not used to specify loss rates due to how this database accounts for losses 
(e.g., a promotion is characterized as a “loss” to a rank, though for our purposes, we 
considered it as a personnel exchange).  This implies that loss rates are assumed constant 
across ranks for a given community and YCS.  The estimated annual loss rates 
summarized in Table 6 are considered our baseline loss rates. 
Our second topic addresses changes to this baseline loss rate.  Deviating from 
RCMOP, we abandon the premise that loss rates remain constant over the modeling time 
frame.  As a preliminary investigation into the impact of different loss rates, we modify 
baseline loss rates (Table 6) by taking a “reasonable” scalar multiple of the entire table.  
This implies that loss rates are changed proportionally across ranks and YCS, but it is not 
intended to capture the impact of policy changes designed to influence certain groups 
(such as by designator, YCS, or both).  Specific changes to baseline loss rates are 
discussed further in Section IV.C.  Note: The RCMOP-2 model converts annual loss rates 
into monthly loss rates internally. 
The final aspect of loss rates addresses limiting the loss rates, when necessary.  
YCS appears to have significant impact on loss rates, and we capture this relationship 
through a more refined upper bound on loss rates.  After gathering historical data similar 
to our baseline loss, we consider non-overlapping three year average loss rates between  
FY 1976 and FY 2005 (e.g., FYs 1976-78, FYs 1979-81, … , FYs 2003-05).  From this 
data we construct a notional  “highest loss” scenario for every designator by using the 
highest observed loss rate for each YCS; for instance, the “highest loss” for surface 
warfare officers may be built as follows: “highest loss for YCS 0” occurs during FYs 
1976-78, “highest loss for YCS 1” occurs during FYs 1982-84, etc.  Because the 
historical observations include the significant force reductions required by the 1991 
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Defense Authorization Act [Durso et. al, 1995], we inflate our “highest loss” scenarios by 
a modest 25% and use these values as a refined upper bound on losses.  Our methodology 
creates potential for loss rates to theoretically exceed 100%, in which case we limit the 
loss rate to exactly 100%. 
YCS INTEL 
RL- 
OTHER CEC SUPPLY AVIAT
URL- 
OTHER SPEC SUB SWO 
0 0.5% 1.0% 0.5% 1.7% 1.8% 50.0% 5.9% 0.7% 1.2% 
1 0.9% 1.0% 1.5% 1.8% 2.3% 0.0% 3.1% 1.6% 2.5% 
2 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 2.0% 1.3% 0.0% 1.6% 1.7% 2.6% 
3 5.8% 8.6% 9.4% 5.8% 1.6% 0.0% 1.6% 1.6% 7.4% 
4 7.6% 9.4% 10.4% 6.7% 2.1% 0.0% 6.1% 11.4% 10.9% 
5 4.6% 3.4% 7.4% 7.7% 0.9% 100.0% 4.6% 14.4% 12.7% 
6 4.5% 4.0% 8.1% 3.9% 1.9% 0.0% 4.5% 20.1% 13.8% 
7 6.1% 3.8% 5.3% 7.7% 9.2% 0.0% 6.3% 15.6% 4.4% 
8 5.2% 3.4% 7.6% 6.9% 17.8% 0.0% 5.6% 5.2% 3.9% 
9 5.5% 13.6% 9.9% 10.1% 12.8% 0.0% 12.6% 5.1% 6.1% 
10 6.4% 11.3% 8.5% 2.7% 11.6% 0.0% 7.0% 6.6% 7.9% 
11 11.6% 8.0% 4.3% 6.1% 4.9% 0.0% 13.1% 6.9% 7.2% 
12 9.8% 6.6% 5.6% 6.8% 3.1% 0.0% 2.7% 6.9% 4.8% 
13 2.3% 5.8% 5.5% 4.6% 3.8% 20.0% 2.6% 3.2% 2.7% 
14 1.2% 4.0% 1.9% 2.5% 2.0% 20.0% 1.4% 3.6% 1.6% 
15 2.8% 4.5% 3.8% 6.9% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0% 4.8% 2.9% 
16 0.8% 3.2% 4.0% 2.8% 2.2% 18.8% 2.6% 2.2% 1.4% 
17 1.4% 4.0% 9.9% 5.7% 4.0% 15.0% 0.0% 7.4% 3.0% 
18 5.7% 9.7% 13.1% 11.7% 7.4% 40.7% 4.6% 7.5% 6.1% 
19 26.8% 28.1% 38.0% 30.4% 29.7% 63.3% 28.8% 19.2% 23.8% 
20 6.8% 16.8% 18.8% 14.4% 12.3% 18.8% 13.0% 6.5% 11.1% 
21 4.9% 9.9% 16.1% 9.4% 12.3% 20.0% 5.1% 9.8% 11.0% 
22 8.2% 12.6% 10.7% 16.8% 12.0% 15.4% 7.9% 9.9% 9.1% 
23 30.0% 12.7% 22.4% 20.0% 11.2% 20.0% 8.1% 7.8% 11.2% 
24 13.9% 24.9% 29.7% 17.4% 15.3% 27.3% 20.0% 10.9% 13.0% 
25 20.7% 23.6% 23.1% 23.2% 24.7% 20.8% 28.1% 17.5% 19.9% 
26 9.1% 26.9% 13.3% 29.8% 22.8% 16.7% 20.0% 23.1% 21.9% 
27 31.3% 28.6% 15.4% 27.8% 26.5% 16.7% 18.2% 9.7% 24.5% 
28 57.1% 33.3% 28.6% 28.0% 31.9% 37.5% 23.1% 32.6% 29.4% 
29 60.0% 65.0% 60.0% 50.0% 46.6% 66.7% 63.6% 25.0% 29.6% 
30 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 25.0% 0.0% 0.0% 50.0% 22.2% 




Accession data comes directly from the annual strength and planning guidance 
given to all accession sources [CNP 2008].  These sources include Naval Academy, 
NROTC, OCS, and Seaman to Admiral 21 commissioning programs.  The first two are 
captured in , , ,r d y taccessNAROTC , while the latter pair comprises , , ,r d y taccessOCS , 
and are shown in Table 7.  Navy guidance provides maximum and minimum estimates 
for each designator; RCMOP-2 utilizes the mean of this range as a point estimate for 
input data.  
  Projected monthly OCS/Seaman to Admiral 21 accessions  
 SWO SUB SPEC AVIAT INTEL RL.OTHER SUPPLY CEC
FY 2009 25 11 2 33 3 3 11 4 
FY 2010 29 11 2 34 3 4 12 5 
FY 2011 30 11 2 34 4 4 12 5 
FY 2012 29 11 2 34 3 4 12 5 
         
   Projected annual USNA/NROTC accessions 
 SWO SUB SPEC AVIAT INTEL RL.OTHER SUPPLY CEC
May 2009 522 270 72 596 13 21 10 9 
May 2010 478 279 78 570 14 17 6 11 
May 2011 534 279 77 633 4 18 6 11 
May 2012 542 279 77 632 13 16 7 10 
Table 7.   Upper table:  Projected monthly accessions for OCS (which are constant 
for each FY).  Lower table:  Projected accessions for USNA/NROTC 
(occurring annually in May). 
Note: , , ,r d y taccessOCS  (Table 7) refers to input data, while , , ,r d y tACCESSOCS  is 
a decision variable within the model and is further discussed later in this chapter. 
3. Initial Personnel Inventory and Work Requirements  
Values for initial inventory ( , ,0r d yinvent ) and work requirements ( , ,r j treq ) are 
taken from the Total Force Manpower Management System (TFMMS) database, the 
principal Navy database tracking personnel and billets [CNO 2007].  Inventory data 
depicts the Navy as of October 1, 2008.  Requirements data is available only by FY.  If 
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work requirements remain constant over a given FY, the model would behave 
unrealistically, and present usually large gains, losses, and exchanges every September in 
an effort to meet the new requirement for the following FY.  As a result, monthly 
requirements are interpolated between consecutive FY’s, incrementally changing 
requirements to reflect the increase (or decrease) needed between any two FY’s. 
The TFFMS database contains actual billet and personnel designator codes found 
in the NOC.  Mapping these numerical codes to the aggregated types used by RCMOP-2 
is both a critical and time consuming pre-processing task. 
4. Cost and Budget Data 
Personnel costs ( , ,costr y t ) essentially monetizes the current inventory.  Monthly 
officer costs are derived from multiple sources, including the Defense Finance and 
Accounting Service, DoN budget estimates, Navy Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA), and 
sponsor-supplied cost element data for FY 2008.   
Our input parameter, , ,costr y t , is based on basic allowance for subsistence 
(BAS), basic allowance for housing (BAH), overseas housing allowance (OHA), federal 
insurance contributions act (FICA), and retired pay accrual (RPA).  Monthly officer costs 
are found by calculating the sum of basic pay, average housing allowance (including 
BAH and OHA), BAS, FICA, and RPA for an officer of a specific rank and years of 
service in October 2008.  Subsequent monthly values in 2008 are identical, and an 
appropriate inflation index allows propagation of these values into future years. 
Similarly, budget estimates ( fbudget ) are derived from the sum of the products 
of work requirements ( , ,r j treq ) and the cost elements of the work requirements within a 
given FY.  These costs are derived from the PR for FY 2011 manpower programming 
rates and use equivalent cost elements as monthly officer costs [Ferguson 2008].  Explicit 
rates exist for FY 2011 and FY 2012, and through application of appropriate   NCCA 
inflation indices, rates for FY 2009 and FY 2010 may be derived.  Budget estimates 
utilized in RCMOP-2 and associated data are shown in Table 8. 
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O1  $   68,979 3925  $   71,296 3995  $   73,690 4055 $   77,649 4051 
O2  $   88,478 4951  $   91,449 4728 $   94,520 4725 $   99,654 4733 
O3  $ 109,380 10160  $ 113,053 10103 $ 116,850 10141 $ 123,237 10150 
O4  $ 131,687 7065  $ 136,109 7038 $ 140,680 7014 $ 148,423 7024 
O5  $ 153,004 4883  $ 158,142 4874 $ 163,453 4868 $ 172,494 4870 
O6  $ 182,148 2138  $ 188,265 2137 $ 194,587 2131 $ 205,338 2129 
Budget  $ 3,887,014,476   $  3,990,421,637   $  4,127,479,421   $  4,356,807,565  
Table 8.   Estimated programming rates and modeled budget amounts for FYs 
2009-12. 
The similar cost elements between , ,costr y t  and fbudget  form a sound basis 
for comparison.  Note: Details regarding the calculation of “average housing allowance,” 
FICA, and RPA are omitted here, and can be found in the Clark [2009, pp. 61-64]. 
5. Objective Function Parameters 
The baseline penalties assigned to specific jobs ( jw ) are given in Table 9.  Values 
are consistent with Clark [2009], but bear the same caveat:  weights are for testing 













Table 9.   Baseline penalty weights by work requirement. 
 35
Values for a fraction (up to kl ) of unfilled jobs within bracket k are likewise not 
driven by an empirical source, and remain static for testing purposes in RCMOP-2.  Table 
10 outlines the five partitions used, k = 1 … 5, and associated population brackets.  Note:  
Figures 5-6 and associated discussion in Section II.C are germane to the relationship 
between weights and population segments. 
Segment 
(k) kl  
Population 
Bracket 
1 10% 0 - 10% 
2 10% 10 - 20% 
3 10% 20 - 30% 
4 20% 30 - 50% 
5 50% 50 - 100% 
Table 10.   Segments, fractional segment lengths, and associated populations. 
6. “Hard-coded” Inputs into RCMOP-2 
This section details parameters used by the model that are found internal to the 
programming code implementing RCMOP-2.  These inputs could still be modified, but 
are not brought in from an external file in the current implementation. 
Specifically: minOCS and maxOCS are set at 0.5 and 1.25 respectively, and 
permit RCMOP-2 some flexibility in choosing , , ,r d y tACCESSOCS (as a decision variable) 
to be between 50% and 125% of the planned OCS accessions ( , , ,r d y taccessOCS ) for a 
given month.  Additionally, we limit the quantity of officers (for a given rank and 
designator) allowed to fill jobs “one rank up and one rank down” at 5%.  β ,r d  is implicitly 
the remaining 95%.  The penalty coefficient, γk, is a user input as a function of k, and is 
further detailed in Section IV.B.  Finally, the fraction of work requirement that may 
remain unmet (i.e., unfilled jobs) for a given rank is unconstrained in all of our scenarios, 
leaving η ,r j  = 1.00. 
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B. FUSION OF OUTPUT FILES PRODUCED BY RCMOP-2 
The user has significant purview over the files produced by RCMOP-2, and the 
current implementation produces ten different output files.  Some of these files contain 
“new” information, such as the value of the objective function, or values of decision 
variables (e.g., ′, , , ,r r d j tFILL ).  Others rework “old” information such as work 
requirements ( , ,r j treq ), modifying the structure of the data into a revised format.  Aside 
from the value of the objective function, the raw files produced by RCMOP-2 provide 
little immediate insight and require substantial effort for interpretation. 
C. DATA FUSION AND SYNTHESIS 
Examining multiple sets of RCMOP-2 outputs, each requiring significant post-
processing, is time prohibitive and prone to a myriad of opportunities for human error.  
This realization has led to development of a fusion tool that consolidates all raw files 
produced into a single file, in order to speed and ease analysis, as well as to reduce the 
likelihood of operator error.   
The pace of exploratory analysis has improved following the creation of a single-
source data file using the fusion tool.  Expecting to repeat the analysis on multiple runs of 
the RCMOP-2 model has been a critical factor in developing a second tool, the summary 
tool, as a way to rapidly and consistently synthesize fused data in multiple runs. 
1. Fusion Tool 
The various text files produced by RCMOP-2 are in a generally similar matrix 
structure, where the indices for a given decision variable/parameter (DV/p) are found in 
the left columns and the values of the DV/p in the right columns.   
The fusion tool is developed in Microsoft® Visual Basic 6.5, Version 1020 and 
uses Microsoft® Office Excel® 2007.  The user provides a path to a folder containing all 
raw files produced by RCMOP-2 and a listing of these files.  The fusion tool iteratively 
opens the listed files and moves the columnar information from the raw output files into a 
consolidated data file.  The fusion tool creates a larger matrix with all desired 
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information, with appropriate indices to the left and corresponding DV/p values to the 
right.  Not every index is needed for every DV/p, resulting in a relatively sparse matrix.  
An outline of the consolidated matrix created by the fusion tool is depicted in Table 11. 
 
Indices (7 columns) 
r r’ d d’ y j t 
Decision Variable / Parameter 
r r' d   j t FILL      (in column 8) 
r  d  y  t HYT      (in column 9) 
r  d  y  t INVENT, NLOSS, FLOSS, OCSACCESS  (in columns 10-13) 
r  d  y  t PROM      (in column 14)  
r  d d' y  t PROMTRF         (in column 15) 
r     j t req , SURPLUS , 
k
KDEFICIT∑   (in columns 16-18) 
r  d d' y  t TRF           (in column 19) 
Table 11.   Consolidated data matrix. 
One critical piece of user input is the way in which a specific raw output file is 
mapped to the consolidated file.  For instance, the raw ′, , , ,r r d j tFILL  file contains six 
columns.  The first five are indices (r, r’, d, j, t) and the sixth contains the value 
of ′, , , ,r r d j tFILL .  We transfer the data in the first three columns of the raw file (e.g., r, r’, 
d) to the first three columns of the consolidated file.  The remaining data in the raw file 
(three columns) is moved into the columns six through eight of the consolidated file. 
The fusion tool is generalized to a large degree and would need only minor 
modifications if the mapping to the consolidated file changed (i.e., if raw output files 
were added/removed). 
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2. Summary Tool 
The fusion of data speeds subsequent analysis.  This process is further expedited 
through the “summary tool” especially developed for this research.  This tool is also 
implemented using the abovementioned Microsoft® products.  Single-source data enables 
us to leverage the pivot table feature of Excel® 2007, allowing manipulation of the view 
of a data set, without modifying the underlying data.  The summary tool captures a series 
of pivot table manipulations and produces preliminary analysis report for a given data set, 
which may be replicated on another data set.  Consistent reporting between differing data 
sets improves both the quality and speed of subsequent analysis. 
Given a single set of outputs from RCMOP-2, the fusion and summary tools can 
be sequentially employed to produce a preliminary summary in roughly 5-10 minutes.  
These initial reports, originally intended as internal documents, remain somewhat 
unpolished and are presented in Figures 8-10.   
Each summary contains: 
• Value of the objective function, unfilled jobs, and penalty type, 
• Balance of flow for the modeled time-frame, 
• Modeled cost and budget data for each FY, 
• Deficit analysis charts examining officer shortfalls: 
o for selected communities, 
o as a percentage of required billets, and 
o aggregated over FYs and ranks. 
• Plots of , ,r j treq , , , ,r d y tINVENT , and “met” requirements over time for: 
o the entire modeled population,  
o each rank, and 
o each designator. 
• Preliminary numerical analysis of: 
o  , , ,r d y tFLOSS  and , , ,r d y tHYT  , 
o  , , , ,r d d y tTRF ′  and , , , ,r d d y tPROMTRF ′  , and 
o , , ,r d y tPROM  and , , , ,r d d y tPROMTRF ′  . 




Figure 8.   First summary report screen capture. 
In Figure 8, the upper left box reports administrative information.  Immediately 
below is the balance of flow for this scenario.  To the right of these boxes, the objective 
function value, type of penalty employed, and percentage of jobs vacant are recorded.  
The third box down on the left contains a summary of financial information.  The bar 
graph illustrates our initial analysis of unfilled billets.   
The remaining graphs show the relationships between billet requirements 
(“.REQ”), personnel inventory (“.INV”), and the number of requirements being satisfied 
(“.MET”).  The larger line graph (bottom left) is for the entire modeled population, while 
the six smaller charts on the right make the same comparisons aggregated by rank. 
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Figure 9.   Second summary report screen capture. 
Figure 9 contains preliminary analysis on forced and HYT losses in the upper left, 
while examination of transfers (using different aggregations) are displayed in the lower 
left.  The remaining figures are a continuation of the smaller charts previously described 
in Figure 8 (e.g., requirements, inventory, and met requirements) though these are 
aggregated by billet type rather than by rank.  Only six of the ten billet aggregations are 
shown here, with the remaining four appearing in Figure 10.  The remaining information 
on the left portion of Figure 10 is promotion analysis aggregated by rank and FY. 
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Figure 10.   Third summary report screen capture. 
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IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter reports our results and analysis methodology.  We compare linear 
and non-linear penalties in RCMOP-2, and explore scenarios of plausible loss rates.   
We solve RCMOP-2 on a laptop computer at 2.6 GHz with 3.5 Gb of RAM, 
running Windows XP™.  The model is implemented and generated using the General 
Algebraic Modeling Language [GAMS Development Corporation 2010], and we solve it 
using Newton’s barrier method within CPLEX and default settings [GAMS/CPLEX , 
2010].  A typical instance of RCMOP-2 has approximately 56,000 continuous variables 
and 193,000 constraints, and solves to optimality in approximately one minute.   
A. MEETING REQUIREMENTS 
An important part of our discussion in this chapter concerns the quantity of billets 
filled.  When determining this number, it is essential to understand the interaction 
between the INVENTORY and FILL decision variables and the req parameter in 
equations (6) - (7).  For example, Figure 11 illustrates the concept of a billet requirements 
being “met” at the O2 level.  While the planning month, YCS, job type, and designator 
are tracked within the model, for simplicity they are omitted from the figure and 
subsequent discussion. 
 
Figure 11.   Interaction of decision variables and parameters in determining quantity of 
requirements being satisfied. 
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A notional inventory of O2 personnel may fill billets at the O1 through O3 level.  
We use the parameter β ,r d  to limit the number of r = O2 personnel assigned to non-O2 
billets in designator d.  For example, 95% of O2’s must fill an O2 billet.  When looking 
at the number of O2 billets filled, we must consider O1, O2, and O3 personnel who may 
be assigned to an O2 billet.  The sum of these personnel is the number of O2 billet 
requirements being “met.”  A simple ratio of “met” requirements versus the requirement 
parameter of O2 billets yield the fraction of billet requirements that are satisfied.  This 
new metric is used throughout this chapter.  Remark: We note that, in the current 
formulation of RCMOP-2, β ,r d  only guarantees that a fraction of at least 2,O dβ  personnel 
will be performing O2 jobs.  But, it does not ensure that a fraction of O2 jobs will be 
done by O2 personnel.  For instance, in Figure 11, 2,O dβ  is graphically represented by the 
connection between variables “O2” INVENTORY and “O2 in O2 job” FILL.  It is the 
only connection that is constrained in our model. 
B. RCMOP-2 RESULTS 
1. Data Fidelity 
We have made significant efforts to replicate many elements of Clark’s work for 
RCMOP-2.  We acknowledge that there are minute differences: cost and budget inputs 
are premised, in part, on NCCA inflation indices, accessions plans are promulgated 
annually—in these cases, we use more recent guidance, which is not significantly 
different.  The largest differences are found in the FY budget constraints, where our 
values are roughly 1.3% higher than earlier estimates.  In neither Clark’s nor this work do 
budgets estimates become a binding constraint. 
Through the addition of more personnel designators and corresponding billet 
types over a nearly identical starting inventory, RCMOP-2 implicitly places additional 
constraints than those in RCMOP.  We expect slightly differing results than those seen in 
RCMOP due to additional resolution and increasing the time horizon from two to four 
years. 
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In order to replicate RCMOP’s linear objective function, we employ a linear 
penalty function (i.e., a unique segment 11, 1k γ= = ). 
In RCMOP, the OTHER personnel designator included 8,846 officers who were 
essentially uncharacterized.  In RCMOP-2, these same 8,846 officers are categorized as 
INTEL, SUPPLY, CEC, and RL-OTHER.  This final group, RL-OTHER, contains 4,052 
personnel who remain essentially uncharacterized, and represent approximately 45% of 
the 8,846 officers who were previously uncharacterized in RCMOP. 
 
 
Figure 12.   RCMOP-2 results examining billet requirements, satisfied billet 
requirements and personnel inventories of four new designators in 
RCMOP-2 with a linear penalty. 
In Figure 12, we see billet requirements, met requirements, and personnel 
inventory for INTEL, SUPPLY, CEC, and RL-OTHER billet designators in RCMOP-2.  
The met requirements and billet requirements curves are nearly indistinguishable, 
indicating each individual community is adequately filling jobs from their personnel 
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inventory.  The large spike late in the modeling horizon in an otherwise stable RL-
OTHER inventory raises concern over end effects [Brown et al., 2004].  This conclusion 
could not be reached in RCMOP because excess personnel in one community may fill 
shortages in others as a result of the broader aggregation of those communities into the 
OTHER community of that model. 
 
Figure 13.   RCMOP and RCMOP-2 results:  Unfilled billets by rank and FYs over 
respective two- and four-year time horizons. 
Figure 13 compares billet vacancies, aggregated by FY and rank between 
RCMOP and RCMOP-2, and illustrates both fidelity effects and the impact of extending 
the modeling horizon.  Recall that in RCMOP-2, the SUPPLY and CEC officers are 
ineligible to fill j1000 billets (Figure 3), while they are permitted to do so in RCMOP.  
Using the initial inventory, this effectively removes 3,379 officers (i.e., 10% of the total 
personnel inventory) from consideration for j1000 billets.  In Figure 13, RCMOP-2 
typically has a larger number of shortages in the ranks O4 through O6 than RCMOP, 
which drives the total billet shortfall higher in RCMOP-2 when comparing equivalent 
FYs between the two models.  Also, the total shortage trends lower over time in both 
models, as expected. 
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Impacts of the increased time horizon are also seen in Figure 13 and relate to the 
flow of personnel.  In reality, officers spend two years in both the O1 and O2 ranks, but 
due to our YCS advancement assumption, which is identical in RCMOP, this is not 
always the case.  RCMOP’s 24-month horizon allows accessions in the first seven 
months (which excludes any larger numbers of May accessions) to reach the rank of O2, 
and is inadequate for any new accessions to progress to the rank of O3.  In contrast, 
accessions in the first 31 months of RCMOP-2 may reach the rank of O2 (and includes 
two larger May accession groups).  It is even possible for those commissioned in the first 
seven months of RCMOP-2 to reach the rank of O3.  Comparing the behaviors of the O1 
and O2 populations over time between the two models illustrates this (Figure 13).  In 
RCMOP, O1s and O2s initially contribute 62% of the annual billet shortage, which 
decreases to 56% in the second and final year of the model.  In RCMOP-2, the same 
population accounts for 58% in the first year, and by the fourth year, this figure is 
reduced to 9% of the annual billet vacancies.  This behavior is expected, since our 
personnel flow is inherently time dependent.  Increasing the time horizon allows both 
greater numbers of personnel flow (i.e., total flow volume will be higher), and for these 
greater numbers to matriculate further into the existing rank structure. 
2. Comparison of Linear and Non-linear Penalties 
This section examines RCMOP-2 outputs when the values for γk are modified, 
creating different non-linear penalties.  In our examples, we set 1xk kγ −=  where 1x ≥  
is a “penalty exponent” of our choice.   If 1x = , then 1kγ = ,  for all values of k, 
resulting in a linear penalty.  When x > 1, non-linear penalties increasing with k occur.  
For this analysis, values of { }1,1.5,2,2.5x ∈  are explored and results are 
summarized in Table 12 and Figure 14. 
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Item Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
 Linear Penalty Non-linear penalties 
1.  Penalty Exponent (x) x = 1.0 x = 1.5 x = 2.0 x = 2.5 
2.  Gap index 5.24% 3.79% 2.59% 1.93% 
3.  Percent of billets unfilled 5.99% 6.05% 5.88% 6.38% 
4.  FY 2009 Budget Estimate $  3,939 million $  3,939 million $  3,939 million $  3,939 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,508 million $  3,512 million $  3,511 million $  3.510 million 
  Potential Savings $   430 million $     427 million $     428 million $     429 million 
5.  FY 2010 Budget Estimate $  4,048 million $  4,048 million $  4,048 million $  4,048 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,649 million $  3,654 million $  3,654 million $  3,649 million 
  Potential Savings $     399 million $     394 million $     394 million $     399 million 
6.  FY 2011 Budget Estimate $  4,127 million $  4,127 million $  4,127 million $  4,127 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,759 million $  3,765 million $  3,767 million $  3,759 million 
  Potential Savings $     367 million $     362 million $     360 million $     368 million 
7.  FY 2012 Budget Estimate $  4,356 million $  4,356 million $  4,356 million $  4,356 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,865 million $  3,868 million $  3,876 million $  3,866 million 
  Potential Savings $     491 million $     487 million $     480 million $     490 million 
8.  Officer Flow:   Starting Inventory = 30,753 = 30,753 = 30,753 = 30,753 
Natural Losses - 8,985 - 8,946 - 8,937 - 8,967 
Forced Losses - 1,442 - 1,499 - 1,447 - 1,935 
HYT Losses - 0 - 0 - 0 - 0 
OCS Accessions + 5,910 + 5,910 + 5,910 + 5,910 
USNA/ROTC Accessions + 6,104 + 6,104 + 6,104 + 6,104 
Final Inventory = 32,340 = 32,322 = 32,382 = 31,865 
Table 12.   RCMOP-2 results:  Comparison of scenarios with linear and non-linear penalties.  (Note: dollar amounts may not add 




Figure 14.   RCMOP-2 results:  Total personnel requirements, inventory, and met requirements (upper figures), and officer shortages 
(as a percentage of billets required) by rank, designator, and FY (bottom figures).  Left and right columns are for 
scenarios 1 and 4, respectively. 
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a. Gap Index and Unfilled Billets 
Lines 1 and 2 of Table 12 suggest an inverse relationship between the 
penalty exponent, x, and the gap index (our objective function value).  This should not be 
understood as results for larger values of x are necessarily better.  For example, suppose 
the total penalty were constant between two scenarios with different values of x.  As x 
increases, the normalizing w  also increases, forcing the gap index lower.  Maximum 
penalties are not achieved, but are necessary to normalize the gap index in each case.  
Hence, the gap index alone is useful for determining the optimal solution and/or 
performance comparison for a fixed x, but, comparisons of the gap index for differing x 
(or K) values are not immediately obvious. 
Increasing the number of penalty tiers and “penalty exponent” (i.e., K  
and x) causes more homogeneous losses across communities.  Increases to K  and x 
would eventually ensure that no second billet vacancy occurs in a given community until 
a billet vacancy occurs in every other community.   
Percentage of unfilled billets remains relatively constant at nearly 6%. 
b. Personnel Costs, Budget and Potential Savings 
Fiscal figures are nearly indistinguishable between scenarios, and 
RCMOP-2 offers roughly 8-11% cost savings in a given FY.  We do note that potential 
savings decline over the first three FYs, and then reach their maximum value in their final 
FY. 
c. Personnel Flow and Verification of HYT and OCS Accession 
Results 
Balance of personnel flow is also comparable between scenarios.  The 
HYT losses and OCS accessions merit further comment. HYT losses are zero for these 
four scenarios.  In fact, HYT losses have remained zero in each of the scenarios run in 
this research.  As an excursion to verify that this was only the result of multiple optimal 
 51
solutions, a modest penalty was added to the , , ,r d y tFLOSS  decision variable and added to 
a test objective function.  Results from this excursion model had reduced (and non-zero) 
values for , , ,r d y tFLOSS  and slightly increased values for , , ,r d y tHYT .  In other words, 
RCMOP-2 uses , , ,r d y tFLOSS  and , , ,r d y tHYT  semi-interchangeably: anyone eligible for 
HYT loss could instead be counted as a forced loss, though the converse is not true.   
The second item relates to the decision variable , , ,r d y tACCESSOCS .  In 
every scenario run in RCMOP-2 its value remains at 5,910, which is the model’s upper 
bound of 125% of planned OCS accessions.  Again, an excursion was made modifying 
both the input parameters maxOCS and , , ,r d y taccessOCS .  This second excursion 
showed varying values for our decision variable , , ,r d y tACCESSOCS  once input 
parameters were sufficiently increased. 
d. Inventory, Requirements, Met Requirements, and Deficit 
Analysis 
Figure 14 compares certain outputs from scenarios 1 and 4.  Scenarios 2 
and 3 showed similar results to the latter providing intermediate values between the two 
scenarios illustrated.  The upper charts show the Navy-wide officer billet requirements, 
personnel inventory and requirements being met for each scenario.  In scenario four, the 
met requirements curve shows more minute movement along the saw-tooth structure 
common to both graphs.   
The gap between the inventory and met requirements curves seems to 
widen between June 2010 and April 2012.  The slope of each curve is a rate of change in 
personnel per unit time, that is, these represent some form of a loss rate.  The steepness of 
the inventory curve is being mitigated through the accession of new officers, who have 
not met their obligated service time and thus have lower loss rates.  The slope of the met 
requirements curve is less steep during the first two cycles (through May 2010) due to the 
increased accession of new officers (e.g., excess O1s may be assigned to O2 jobs).  In 
May 2010 the model becomes “O1 saturated” and the slope, moving forward, reflects the 
loss rate for personnel that O1s cannot replace in the model (e.g., O3 and above).  As 
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noted in previous discussion on loss rates, these personnel generally have higher loss 
rates than new accessions; for example, compare YCS < 2 and YCS > 4 from Table 6. 
e. Deficit Analysis 
The bottom two charts in Figure 14 show the ratio of total deficit to jobs 
required aggregated over each FY, for all ranks and selected designators in both 
scenarios.  Designators selected have the largest contribution to the total deficit and, by 
extension, the largest impact on our objective function.  Both of the lower charts show 
that over time the percentage deficit (by billet type) shrinks, with the exception of the 
j1000 billets.  Given the lower weight assigned to these billets, this is not surprising.  
Examining the SPEC billets, both graphs show a sizeable percentage deficit well 
dispersed across ranks. 
Contrasting the lower figures, the shortfall in the j1000 billets is 
strikingly different.  The left panel, where penalties are constant (and equal to the 
weights), shows that the j1000 penalty is preferred over any other penalty.  For 
example, given a group of SUB officers, the model will preferentially assign them to SUB 
jobs over j1000 jobs. The j1000 jobs are filled only after the SUB jobs are filled (if 
there are excess SUB personnel remaining), because the penalty for unfilled SUB billets 
is always three times greater than unfilled j1000 billets.  In the scenario 1 graph, 
knowing that j1000 jobs will be preferentially unfilled, the shortfalls for other 
designators reflect the ranks and designators where requirements exceed inventory.  The 
right chart has significantly lower percentages associated with the j1000 billets.  Here 
we see the impact of non-linear penalties:  as j1000 billets are not filled, they become 
more and more penalized, until the cost of not filling the next j1000 billet is greater 
than the penalty of another designator.  We clearly see the shortage percentage declining 
for j1000 billets, but not a corresponding increase in other designators.  This is due to 
the relative sizes of each type of billet.  Note:  Requirements are, approximately 3,300 
j1000 billets; 3,000 SUB billets; 5,000 SWO billets; and 10,000 AVIAT billets.  Closer 
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inspection of the lower right chart in Figure 14 shows that for SWO billets in FY 2011 and 
FY 2012, there is an increase compared to the same periods for scenario 1. 
f. Promotions 
A summary of promotions is provided in Table 13.  Promotions to the 
control grades (i.e., O4 – O6) may occur within a three-year window and promotion rates 
should fall within specific thresholds as summarized in Table 5.  The calculation of 
promotion rates, however, is not obvious because every year some officers begin the year 
within a promotion zone and move out of this window due to a gain in YCS, and vice 
versa.  Though the calculation may be slightly flawed, we still compute promotions into 
the three controlled officer grades annually in each of our four scenarios, yielding 48 
promotion rates.  Our estimate of promotions indicates that RCMOP-2 results do not 
remain within desired promotion rate thresholds in 28 of 48 cases, preferred “under” 
promoting to “over” promoting by a 3:1 ratio, and was up to 25% outside the acceptable 
window.  This suggests that promotion rates as established by law may be insufficient to 
support an optimal allocation of officers to billets.  By comparison, Clark [2009] reports 
only one case (of six) where promotions deviated from guidance in the original RCMOP 
model. 
Examining the average YCS of individuals promoted, RCMOP-2 clearly 
promotes early within the promotion windows.  Only once in the four scenarios does the 
average YCS reach the midpoint of the promotion window (Scenario 1 in FY 2010 for 
O6s).  In Scenario 4, the 9.0 average YCS for O4s during FY 2009 suggests that, in some 
cases, the model may be promoting too many “below zone” personnel.  Lacking a precise 
definition of “below zone” and not having promotion zones within the RCMOP-2 






  Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
 to rank O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 
Promoted 1,624 2,226 2,005 911 230 1,624 2,226 1,997 959 378FY 
2009 AVG YCS     -        -    9.2 15.7 21.2     -        -    9.1 15.7 21.4
Promoted 1,633 2,167 1,560 823 400 1,633 2,167 1,492 875 418FY 
2010 AVG YCS     -        -    9.5 15.4 22.0     -        -    9.4 15.2 21.7
Promoted 2,874 1,525 906 814 581 2,872 1,525 1,079 799 316FY 
2011 AVG YCS     -        -    9.1 15.3 21.5     -        -    9.6 15.1 21.3
Promoted 2,879 1,528 1,261 833 629 2,879 1,512 1,442 888 566FY 
2012 AVG YCS     -        -    9.6 15.5 21.6     -        -    9.2 15.1 21.3
    Scenario 3 Scenario 4 
  to rank O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 
Promoted 1,624 2,226 1,934 1,020 341 1,624 2,226 1,946 1,125 412FY 
2009 AVG YCS     -        -    9.1 15.6 21.2     -        -    9.0 15.6 21.3
Promoted 1,633 2,167 1,513 840 414 1,633 2,167 1,416 781 416FY 
2010 AVG YCS     -        -    9.4 15.3 21.8     -        -    9.2 15.2 21.5
Promoted 2,873 1,525 1,069 880 381 2,873 1,525 1,179 880 369FY 
2011 AVG YCS     -        -    9.6 15.2 21.9     -        -    9.7 15.2 21.7
Promoted 2,879 1,529 1,489 856 519 2,865 1,527 1,353 953 493FY 
2012 AVG YCS     -        -    9.6 15.4 21.3     9.1 15.3 21.2
Table 13.   RCMOP-2 results:  Promotion summary. 
g. Transfers, Forced Losses, and End Effects 
Table 14 aids our exploration of lateral transfers.  We combine the 
, , , ,r d d y tTRF ′  and , , , ,r d d y tPROMTRF ′   decision variables in this discussion, as the latter is 
typically 1% of the total.  For each scenario, the total quantity of officers leaving 
communities is comparable.  However where these officers are assigned to can vary 







  From / To  INTEL 
 RL-
OTHER  CEC   SUPPLY  Total  
 AVIAT        1,392          1,176       72             321   2,961  
 SPEC              -                 -         2                7          9  
 SUB              -             456       33             146      635  






 Total      2,103         3,289    828        1,064    7,284  
 AVIAT        2,029             854       44             101   3,027  
 SPEC              -                 -         -                9          9  
 SUB          122             432       34              70      659  






 Total      3,189         3,027    435           517    7,168  
 AVIAT        2,028             725       35             257   3,045  
 SPEC              -                 -         -                9          9  
 SUB            46             352     116             150      665  






 Total      2,928         2,809    584           882    7,202  
 AVIAT        2,202             772       29             180   3,183  
 SPEC              -                 -         -                9          9  
 SUB          234             331       87              50      702  






 Total      3,874         2,992    386           442    7,694  
Table 14.   RCMOP-2 results:  summary of transfers in scenarios 1-4.  
The model is diverting officers into INTEL and RL-OTHER when it is 
unable to meet a requirement with officers in their original communities.  For the INTEL 
and RL-OTHER communities any surplus must be allocated to the j1000 jobs in our 
model (Figure 3) or become part of the , ,r j tSURPLUS  variable (i.e., idle personnel).  We 
can visually see that the excesses for these two communities provide a clear majority of 
the personnel filling j1000 jobs in Figure 15.  An earlier comment on the aggregation of 
the 1000-coded billets notes these two communities may fill at most 50% of the j1000 
billets.   
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Figure 15.   RCMOP-2 results for personnel inventory, work requirements, and met 
requirements for j1000, RL-OTHER, and INTEL billets in scenarios 1 and 
4.  Note:  j1000 charts do not have an inventory, since these jobs are filled 
from multiple communities. 
Figure 15 also displays the impact of linear and non-linear penalty 
weights.  On the left (our linear penalty scenario), the numbers of j1000 requirements met 
oscillates with larger amplitude than the corresponding figure on the right.  The converse 
is true for the two remaining pairs of charts.  On the two lower left charts, met 
requirements are very stable (and requirements are frequently satisfied), while on the 
right they show more movement as RCMOP-2 works to avoid the increasing costs of not 
meeting j1000 billet requirements. 
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Forced losses for each scenario were briefly discussed as part of the 
personnel flow balance.  We return to those values to illustrate the likelihood of end 
effects in our model.  Comparing the number of forced losses over the entire four-year 
modeling horizon to those occurring in only the final 6 months (i.e., 12.5% of the time 
frame), the volume of forced losses clearly increases sharply during the last few months 
(Table 15). 





final 6 months 
 Quantity Quantity Percent 
Scenario 1           1,442            940 65% 
Scenario 2           1,499            971 65% 
Scenario 3           1,447            944 65% 
Scenario 4           1,935         1,400 72% 
Table 15.   Evidence of end effects in RCMOP-2:  Comparison of forced losses over 
48 months and the final six months for various penalty scenarios. 
Though end effects appear in the model, not every decision variable is 
impacted by their presence.  Figure 16 shows forced losses and transfers (to include 
concurrent promotions) over the model’s horizon for scenario 4.  There is a clear increase 
in force losses occurring late in the model’s timeframe, as noted in Table 15.  However, 
there is little evidence of end effects affecting transfers.  The other three scenarios also 
showed clear signs of end effects impacting forced losses, and minimal support linking 
transfers with these effects. 
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Figure 16.   Selective sensitivity to end effects in RCMOP-2.  Transfers show little 
impact while forced losses increase notably at the end of the modeling time 
horizon. 
C. EXPLORING LOSS RATES 
1. Generation of Loss Scenarios 
In Chapter III, we discussed how to modify loss rates by a scalar multiple.  In this 
section, we detail the values of these scalars used in this research.  Historical loss rates 
are employed again, but in groups of three-year rates (Figure 17). 
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Figure 17.   Historical three-year loss rates. 
Given the FYs 2006-08 loss rate (black bar in Figure 17), other similar loss rates 
are identified from our observations during FYs 1979-81 and FYs 1991-93 (grey bars).  
The subsequent periods after similar observations are identified as FYs 1982-84 and FYs 
1994-1996 respectively.  Taking the ratio of these loss rates (later period divided by the 
earlier) yields a scalar that reflects the change in the loss rate from one period to the next.  
In Figure 17, the FYs 1982-84 loss rate may be expressed as 74% of the FYs 1979-81 
loss rate.  Similarly, the FYs 1994-96 value is 122% of the prior rate.  We take these 
values as our upper and lower limit to the three-year change in rate.  Note: other time 
periods (e.g., FYs 1976-78, FYs 2000-02) are similar to the FYs 2006-08 loss rate, but 
the ratio of subsequent years yields values between 74% and 122%. 
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In order to accommodate the above loss rates to the model’s four-year horizon, 
loss rates remain unchanged for the first year and are modified annually over the 
following three years.  For the purposes of scenario development, we assume that loss 
rates either increase (i) or decrease (d) as the model moves from one FY to the next.  This 
provides eight unique scenarios.  Note:  Although the three-year averages appear the 
same in some of the scenarios, the order of increases and decreases to the baseline loss 
rate is different.   
We include a baseline scenario in which loss rates do not change, as illustrated in 
Figure 18.  This scenario is identical to scenario 3 from Section B.  Henceforth, we shall 
refer to the highest and lowest loss scenarios (upper and lower branches in Figure 18) as 
High and Low scenarios, respectively. 
 
Figure 18.   Increases (i) and decreases (d) applied to baseline loss rate over four years 
to develop loss scenarios. 
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2. Results Overview for Loss Scenarios 
This portion of our research reports the results of the loss scenarios outlined in the 
previous paragraph.  We employ non-linear penalties in these analyses and fix our 
“penalty exponent” at x = 2 (to be comparable with baseline scenario 3). 
Figure 19 shows the values of the gap index, percentage of unfilled billets, and 
quantity of natural losses in the respective scenarios.  Scenarios High and Low 
consistently represent the extreme values with the baseline case falling roughly about half 
way in-between. 
 
Figure 19.   Nine loss scenarios in RCMOP-2:  results for gap index, percentage of 
unfilled billets, and quantity of natural losses. 
The maximum and minimum gap index values are 2.74% and 2.50%, and 
correspond to scenarios High and Low respectively.  Likewise, the percentage of billets 
varies between 6.45% and 5.50%.  Natural loss totals fall between 9,336 and 8,525 
officers with the lowest losses associated with scenario High.  The values shown here 
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vary by up to 15% and are representative of other output data.  Given the relatively small 
variation between the maximum and minimum values (associated with limiting 
scenarios), in the remainder of this section we only report detailed results on scenarios 
High and Low. 
 
Item Scenario High Scenario Low 
1.  Loss Scalar (annual equivalent) i = 1.071 d = 0.905 
2.  Gap index 2.74% 2.50% 
3.  Percent of billets unfilled 6.45% 5.50% 
4.  FY 2009 Budget Estimate $  3,939 million $  3,939 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,512 million $  3,511 million 
  Potential Savings $     427 million $     428 million 
5.  FY 2010 Budget Estimate $  4,048 million $  4,048 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,649 million $  3,661 million 
  Potential Savings $     399 million $     386 million 
6.  FY 2011 Budget Estimate $  4,127 million $  4,127 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,746 million $  3,790 million 
  Potential Savings $     381 million $     336 million 
7.  FY 2012 Budget Estimate $  4,356 million $  4,356 million 
  Personnel Cost $  3,841 million $  3,918 million 
  Potential Savings $     515 million $     437 million 
8.  Officer Flow:     Starting Inventory = 30,753 = 30,753 
Natural Losses - 9,336 - 8,525 
Forced Losses - 1,597 - 1,602 
HYT Losses - 0 - 0 
OCS Accessions + 5,910 + 5,910 
USNA/ROTC Accessions + 6,104 + 6,104 
Final Inventory = 31,833 = 32,640 
Table 16.   RCMOP-2 results:  Comparison of highest and lowest loss rate 
scenarios.  (Note: dollar amounts may not add due to rounding.) 
3. Gap Index and Unfilled Billets 
Table 16 shows that the scenario High has a gap index of 2.74%, while scenario 
Low has a value of 2.50%.  The fraction of unfilled billets mirrors these results with the 
higher loss scenario leaving 6.45% of jobs vacant, and scenario Low doing slightly better 
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with a 5.50% vacancy rate.  In conjunction with Figure 19, we note a trend where loss 
rates are proportional to both the gap index and percentage of unfilled jobs. 
4. Cost and Budget 
Scenario High generally uses a smaller fraction of the personnel budget, which 
increases the potential savings figures (of course, at the expense of more unfilled billets).  
Annual savings vary between 9.2% and 11.8% for a given FY.  Scenario Low remains 
between 8.2% and 10.9% under annual budget estimates.  Fewer personnel implies lower 
costs and the reduced costs in scenario High are not surprising.  As with our previous cost 
analysis with linear and non-linear penalties, a modest increase in savings during the final 
FY of each scenario appears, and is likely due to end effects and their impact on forced 
losses.   
5. Personnel Flow 
Personnel flows in either scenario are identical with two exceptions.  Forced 
losses are 1,597 officers for scenario High and 1,602 for the low loss case; a nearly 
indistinguishable difference.  Natural losses in these two cases differ by 811 officers, 
which is 8.6% of the 9,336 personnel losses in scenario High.  The OCS accessions 
selected by the model remain at 125% of the planned figures (i.e., the maximum 
permitted by RCMOP-2).  Final inventories are 31,833 and 32,640 officers for scenarios 




Figure 20.   RCMOP-2 results for total personnel requirements, inventory, and met requirements (top figures), and officer shortages 
(as a percentage of billets required) by rank, designator, and FY (bottom figures).  Scenarios High and Low are in the 
left and right columns, respectively. 
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6. Inventory, Requirements, and Deficit Analysis 
The upper panels of Figure 20 contrast results for our high- and low-loss cases, 
showing the total billet requirements, officer inventory, and billets filled for each 
scenario.  At a glance, both panels appear indistinguishable, though closer scrutiny 
reveals subtle differences.  Note that in scenario Low, the personnel inventory and met 
requirements are slightly higher.  The initial inventories in both scenarios are equal and 
over the four-year horizon, the lower loss rates in scenario Low allow it to gradually 
build a progressively greater inventory (than scenario High). As discussed earlier, the 
difference between the inventory and met requirements curves widens after April 2010, 
due to the “O1 saturation” effect and differing loss rates for more senior personnel. 
Figure 20’s lower panels charts the proportion of officer shortages (relative to 
their respective billet requirements) aggregated into FYs, for all ranks and selected billet 
types.  The major difference between the two panels is revealed within the j1000 billets.  
We find: (1) the Low scenario generally has higher inventory levels in any given FY and 
(2) the difference in inventories increases over time.  These factors result in near parity in 
officer shortages in FY 2009 between scenarios, but a clear difference becomes evident 
by FY 2012.  In short, for a given time frame, more personnel implies fewer shortages. 
Similarities among the lower panels of Figures 14 and 20 exist and include the 
decrease in shortage over time (excepting j1000 billets), the decrease in O1 and O2 
shortages over time, and the general magnitude of officer shortage in each community 
(e.g., SPEC billets vacancies lie between 20% and 30%). 
These lower panels (Figures 14 and 20) also capture the percentage deficit of 
officers with specific communities, but do not convey the contribution (by billet type) to 
the total shortfall.  Table 17 compares the fraction of requirements and deficits (for 
scenarios High and Low).  Comparing the shortages for both scenarios in any given billet, 
differences are minimal.  jAVIAT billets are consistently about a third of both billets 
required and vacant jobs.  In other cases, there is significant mismatch, as seen in the case 
of the j1000 and jSPEC billets, where these jobs are a significantly larger proportion of 
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the deficit than the billet population.  On the other hand, surface warfare officer jobs 
account for about a sixth of all jobs and only 2% of job shortages.   






jAVIAT 31% 34% 31% 
j1000  10% 22% 24% 
jSPEC 4% 17% 15% 
jSUB 9% 6% 5% 
jSWO 16% 2% 2% 
All other  
billets 30% 19% 23% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
Table 17.   Percentage of billet requirements and deficits (for high- and low-loss 
cases) by billet type. 
7. Promotions 
Table 18 details promotions for our loss scenarios.  Again, estimates on 
promotion rates are omitted, and a large percentage of these fall outside of current 
guidance. Also, similar to the previous discussion on promotions, the average YCS tends 
towards the earlier side of the allowable promotion window, reaching the midpoint only 
once (scenario Low in FY 2011 for O6s).  Our prior concerns regarding “below zone” 
promotions remain after considering these figures.   
    Scenario High Scenario Low 
  to rank O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 O2 O3 O4 O5 O6 
 Promoted   1,624   2,226  1,965  1,024     395  1,624   2,226  1,977   1,002      355 FY 
2009 Avg. YCS - - 9.0 15.6 21.1 - - 9.1 15.6 21.3
 Promoted   1,632   2,164  1,496     918     466  1,634  2,170  1,465      787      376 FY 
2010 Avg. YCS - - 9.4 15.3 21.7 - - 9.3 15.4 21.7
 Promoted   2,868   1,520  1,107     838     349  2,878  1,530  1,060      980      385 FY 
2011 Avg. YCS - - 9.6 15.2 21.5 - - 9.6 15.2 22.0
 Promoted   2,873   1,518  1,521     850     551  2,886  1,537  1,441      754      486FY 
2012 Avg. YCS - - 9.2 15.2 21.2 - - 9.3 15.5 21.4
Table 18.   RCMOP-2 results:  Promotion summary for high and low loss scenarios. 
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Lower loss rates result in higher personnel inventories leading to greater 
competition for promotion at the control grades.  In practice, this tends to result in 
slightly “slower” promotions (compared to less competitive periods).  This can be seen 
by comparing corresponding average YCS between scenarios, where values for scenario 
Low are higher than or equal to those in scenario High in all but one case. 
8. Transfers, Forced Losses, and End Effects 
Transfers (to include concurrent promotions) are outlined in Table 19.  The total 
quantity of transfers between scenarios is nearly identical, and row totals (indicating 
numbers of personnel leaving a certain designator) are roughly equivalent.  On the other 
hand, column totals (i.e., which designators are receiving officers) show some 
differences.  The intelligence community receives nearly 1,000 more officers in scenario 
High; the bulk of this difference comes from the surface warfare community.  End effects 
are a likely cause for this behavior, because 538 more officers are transferred during the 
final month of scenario High than scenario Low.  Of these 538 officers, 389 are SWOs 
transferred into the INTEL community.  Actual transfers in the final month are 686 and 
148 for scenarios High and Low, respectively. 
 
   From / To   INTEL  RL.OTH  CEC  SUPPLY  Total  
 AVIAT       2,267             825        29              93    3,213  
 SPEC              -                 -          -                9           9  
 SUB          124             354        60              99       638  








 Total      3,917         2,902     359           416    7,594  
 AVIAT       1,990             982        33            277    3,281  
 SPEC              -                 -          -              10         10  
 SUB            76             404        97            138       715  








 Total      2,918         3,106     676           859    7,559  
Table 19.   RCMOP-2 results: Transfers for high- and low-loss scenarios. 
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Significant evidence of end effects remains present in values of forced losses as 






final 6 months 
 Quantity Quantity Percent 
Scenario High           1,597          1,109  69% 
Scenario Low           1,602          1,093  68% 
Table 20.   Evidence of end effects in RCMOP-2:  Comparison of forced losses over 
48 months and final six months for loss scenarios High and Low. 
 69
V. CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTED FUTURE RESEARCH 
This research has demonstrated improvements to RCMOP, a manpower planning 
optimization model for the U.S. Navy, which minimizes the mismatch between personnel 
inventory and billets required while enforcing budget and other manpower constraints.  
The new model, called RCMOP-2, adds more fidelity to the data, and has been analyzed 
under newly added nonlinear penalties and multiple scenarios of loss rates.  This chapter 
reports the most significant findings of that analysis and recommends prospective areas 
for improvement.  
A. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS 
1. Higher Fidelity Improves Model Results 
Five personnel designators and six billet types in RCMOP have been expanded 
into nine and ten categories, respectively, in RCMOP-2.  RCMOP’s most general 
personnel classification, OTHER, initially contains 8,846 officers, which accounts for 
29% of the inventory.  By comparison, RCMOP-2’s most generalized officer category 
contains 4,052 (13% of initial inventory).  Additional personnel and billet classifications 
in RCMOP-2 provide corroborating support into additional communities and improve the 
realism of the model by reducing the number of unauthorized assignments. 
Secondly, the time horizon of the model has been doubled from two to four years.  
This has a significant impact, particularly at the ranks of O2 and below.  O1s and O2s 
account for 62% and 56% of annual officer shortages in the first and last years, 
respectively, of the two-year RCMOP model; a 6% difference.  Over RCMOP-2’s four-
year timeframe the difference is 48%, with a first year contribution of 58% being reduced 




More resolution in the data may, at some stage, reach a point of diminishing 
returns, whether due to file sizes, pre- and post-processing of information, or 
computational times for model runs.  The improvement shown in RCMOP-2 suggests 
that we have not yet reached this threshold. 
2. Non-Linear Penalty Enhancements 
The objective function is improved through the use of non-linear penalties.  These 
penalties allow planners to establish the relative importance of a billet’s shortfall based 
not only on the type of job, but also on the number of unfulfilled billets for that job.  For 
example, the 1000-coded billets have the lowest weight and therefore are the first jobs 
that RCMOP-2 decides to leave unfilled.  However, given that the more unfilled jobs of a 
given type the higher the penalty rate becomes, RCMOP-2 eventually chooses other jobs, 
reducing the fraction of unmet 1000-coded requirements with respect to RCMOP.  
Dispersing unfilled requirements more evenly across multiple categories is consistent 
with current practice.   
3. Loss Rate Explorations 
Our premise for investigating loss rates is that natural loss rates should have 
significant impact on RCMOP-2’s output.  We vary natural loss rates, predicated on 
historical values, between 0.74 and 1.22 of the average FY 2006-2008 loss rates (our 
baseline values) over the final three years of the model’s horizon. The difference in final 
inventory levels between our highest and lowest loss scenarios is 807 officers, and the 
differential in the numbers of natural losses, 811 officers, accounts for the inventory 
differential. 
Comparison of the highest and lowest loss scenarios reveals consistencies 
between the fractions of unfilled billets in each scenario.  Contrasting the billet vacancy 
percentage with the billet requirements percentage offers insight on which communities 
are having problems satisfying billet needs.  Aviators consistently represent about a third 
of all billets required and unfilled billets.  The 1000-coded billets and Special 
Warfare/Operations billets show adverse mismatch between these figures, where their 
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percentage of the billet vacancy is two to four times higher than their percentage of billet 
requirements.  The surface warfare officer community demonstrates favorable mismatch 
in the model, accounting for roughly 16% of all jobs, yet only 2% of unfilled billets.  Our 
results and analysis of loss rates suggests that RCMOP-2 may be less sensitive to this 
parameter than initially suspected. 
4. Increase OCS accessions 
In every scenario, RCMOP-2 consistently recommends increasing OCS 
accessions to 125% of the planned accessions in any time period, which is the maximum 
permitted accession rate.  This is a clear signal that accessions should be increased in 
order to better meet future requirements.  Given the four years officers normally spend in 
ranks of O1 and O2 (two years apiece), the model fully leverages OCS accessions to 
significantly reduce penalties for O1 and O2 ranks in the four-year horizon.   
5. Potential Cost Savings 
Budget estimates used in RCMOP-2 never become a binding constraint.  The 
model consistently reports annual personnel costs approximately 8-12% below budget 
outlays.  Due to end effects observed in the model, the final FY normally produces the 
highest savings, and the above figures may be smaller in reality.  As the Navy’s budget 
becomes more pressurized due to mounting internal and external forces,  this information 
on potential savings may be useful for planners. 
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Time Horizon 
RCMOP-2 uses a four-year horizon.  Despite this is an improvement with respect 
to RCMOP, it still presents two problems:  examination of the control grades (O4 through 
O6) and end effects.   
The control grade inventory problem relates to the military manpower scheme; 
The Navy does not “hire” O4 officers, but rather “grows” them by hiring O1s about a 
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decade earlier.  Accessions in the first month of the model progress only to become 
freshly minted O3s in the final month.  The initial inventory used by RCMOP-2 reflects 
some shortfalls in the control grades.  Given that we use only a four-year horizon, 
RCMOP-2 is unable to correct problems (e.g., “hire” control grade officers), and can only 
work to limit the penalty this group incurs.   
End effects manifest themselves through abnormal behaviors by several decision 
variables in RCMOP-2.  Analysis suggests that forced losses, personnel costs, and 
transfers may experience end effects to varying degrees, though other variables may be 
impacted as well. 
Shifting from monthly to quarterly time steps in the current model would cover a 
twelve-year period, and would begin to address long-term solutions at the O4 level.  We 
recommend exploring longer time horizons of up to 25–30 years. 
2. Weights 
Weights used in the model are subjective, and bear a clear caveat:  weights are not 
tied to any formal or informal guidance from Navy leaders or written policy.  In addition 
to correcting the subjectivity, the dimensionality of the weights could be improved as 
well.  Currently weights are only differentiated by designator. That is, the superior 
knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience of the O6 (compared to an O1) are not 
accounted for in the establishment of the baseline penalties.  
Navy Guidance on the relative importance of job and ranks is needed to improve 
the model for potential use by Navy manpower planners.  Job importance must reflect 
and align with the long-term plans of Navy leaders.  Relative rank importance should 
echo these designs as well, though personnel compensation (e.g., military pay tables) 
provides some objective and empirical insight to the relative rank importance as a 
baseline estimate. 
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3. Future Resolution Improvements, and 1000- and 1050-Coded Billets 
Additional resolution may continue to improve RCMOP-2 performance.  The 
NOC should be the source used for determining future resolution improvements.   
One specific improvement relates to the j1000 billets in the model.  RCMOP-2 
combines the 1000- and 1050-coded billets, each of which is about five percent of the 
total billet requirements.  In reality, intelligence and other restricted line officers are 
eligible for only half of these jobs (1000-coded billets), while unrestricted line officers 
above the rank of O3 are eligible for both 1000- and 1050-billets.  The model allows the 
intelligence and other restricted line communities to fill both jobs.  Typically, RCMOP-2 
builds excess personnel in these two officer groups, and leverages these excess to fill the 
majority of j1000 billets (to include 1050-coded billets for which they are actually 
ineligible).  Future resolution improvements should include segregation of the 1000- and 
1050-coded billets. 
4. Prior Service Impacts 
To remove our assumption that YCS and YOS are equivalent, additional data is 
needed, such as distributions governing the quantity of officers with prior service and the 
length of prior service, for each rank.  A weighted average using these distributions could 
be used to calculate associated costs for these officers.  The change of these distributions 
over time poses a serious problem, though assuming a constant distribution would still be 
an improvement from the current model. 
5. Improving the Gap Index 
Though the objective function of RCMOP-2 is sound, the interpretation of its 
values can be vague and potentially misleading.  Our derived datum w  calculates the 
maximum possible penalty in a given scenario where every job is vacant.  This value is 




That is, using w  to normalize the objective function artificially depresses the value of the 
objective function, yielding minimal absolute differences in the gap index (e.g., only 
0.0024 between the nine loss scenarios).   
Further confusion arises when comparing scenarios with different penalty 
functions.  For instance, in scenarios 1 (with nonlinear exponent x = 1) and 4 (with x = 
2.5), clearly 1 4w w< .  Even if we assume the total penalties accrued were equal for 
both scenarios (e.g., numerators of the objective functions are equal) the gap index of 
scenario 4 would be smaller due to the larger value of 4w , though this scenario may not 
be superior to scenario 1.  Devising an improved metric to allow fair comparisons to be 
made between scenarios m and n when m nw w≠  remains a challenge. 
6. Further Loss Rate Analysis 
Current analysis is performed under the context of “perfect information” and does 
not easily allow for so called “what if” analysis.  Among these, planners may find useful 
exploring impacts on decisions premised, for example, on a low loss scenario, when a 
high loss scenario occurs.   
The existing model could be extended to provide strategic guidance today based 
on “imperfect information.”  For example, this notional extension would recommend the 
best manpower plan now, assuming n outcomes in one year, n2 possible outcomes after 
two years, and n3 outcomes three years in the future.  Such analysis would be very helpful 
for Navy leaders and manpower planners in order to mitigate future risks in balancing 
personnel inventories and billet requirements under uncertain losses. An extension of this 
nature would require the use of stochastic optimization.   
 75
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Ahuja, R. K., Magnanti, T. L., and Orlin, J. B. Network Flows: Theory, Algorithms, and 
Applications. New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993. 
Brown, G. G., Dell, R. F., and Newman, A. M. “Optimizing Military Capital Planning.” 
Interfaces, November 2004: 415–425. 
Brown, M. “National security decision making” NW3285 course documentation, Naval 
Postgraduate School, U.S. Naval War College, College of Distance Education, 
Fall 2009. 
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). Navy total force manpower policies procedures 
(OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1000.16K). OPNAV Instruction, Washington, D.C.: 
Department of the Navy, 2007. 
Chief of Naval Personnel (CNP). United States Naval Academy/Naval Reserve Officer 
Training Corps/Seaman To Admiral-21/Officer Candidate School strength and 
inventory. Memorandom, Washington, D.C.: N1, October 2008. 
Clark, D. T. Navy Officer Manpower Optimization Incorporating Budgetary Constraints. 
Master's Thesis in Operations Research, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2009. 
Director, Manpower, Personnel, Training and Education Policy (N13). Manual of Navy 
Officer Manpower and Personnel Classifications (NAVPERS 15839I). NAVPERS 
Instruction, Millington, TN: Department of the Navy, 2010. 
Durso, A., and S. F. Donahue. “An Analytical Approach to Reshaping the United States 
Army.” Interfaces, February 1995: 109–133. 
Edwards, J. S. “A Survey of Manpower Planning Models and Their Application.” The 
Journal of the Operational Research Society, November 1983: 1031–1040. 
Ferguson, VADM M.E. "PR-11 Military/Civilian/Contractor manpower programming 
rates (FRAGORD 4)." Memorandum, November 6, 2008. 
GAMS Development Corporation. "GAMS - A User's Guide." GAMS On-Line 
Documentation. 2008. 
http://www.gams.com/dd/docs/bigdocs/GAMSUsersGuide.pdf (accessed March 
17, 2010). 
GAMS/CPLEX. “CPLEX 12.”  2007. http://www.gams.com/dd/docs/solvers/cplex.pdf 
(accessed March 17, 2010). 
 76
Gass, S. I. "Military manpower planning models." Computers and Operations Research 
18, 1991: 65–73. 
Holz, B. W., and J. M. Wroth. "Improving strength forecasts: Support for Army 
manpower management." Interfaces, December 1980: 37–52. 
Morben, D. M. A simulation study of an optimization model for surface nuclear accession 
planners. Master's Thesis in Operations Research, Operations Research, 
Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1989. 
Navy Enterprise. “NE Intro Brief.” Navy Enterprise. May 2008. 
http://www.navyenterprise.navy.mil/docs/ppt/NE-Intro-Brief.ppt (accessed 
September 4, 2009). 
Naval Center for Cost Analysis (NCCA). "NCCA Inflation Indices." Naval Center for 
Cost Analysis. January 2008. http://www.ncca.navy.mil/services/inflation.cfm 
(accessed January 2010). 
Office of the Budget. FY 2008 Budget: Highlights of the Department of the Navy. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2007. 
Office of the Budget. FY 2009 Budget: Highlights of the Department of the Navy. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2008. 
Office of the Budget. FY 2010 Budget: Highlights of the Department of the Navy. 
Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2009. 
Peak Software, Inc.  FY09 officer personnel information system data mart. December 8, 
2009. http://support.peaksoftware.com/HylndrDataSvr/ (accessed December 19, 
2009). 
Roughead, ADM G. "CNO guidance for 2007–2008." Navy Enterprise Web site. October 
25, 2007. http://www.navyenterprise.navy.mil/docs/pdf/CNO_Guidance.pdf 
(accessed November 29, 2009). 
Roughead, ADM G. "Why We’re Doing it." Navy Enterprise Web site. March, 2008. 
http://www.navyenterprise.navy.mil/about/why.aspx (accessed September 11, 
2009). 
Roughead, ADM G. "CNO guidance for 2009." U.S. Navy Official Web site. November 
2008. http://www.navy.mil/docs/CNO_Guidance.pdf (November 29, 2009). 
Roughead, ADM G. "CNO guidance for 2010." U.S. Navy Official Web site. September 
2009. http://www.navy.mil/features/CNOG%202010.pdf (November 29, 2009). 
Salmerón, J. “Report on MPT&E Research Project.” Naval Postgraduate School, 
February 2010. 
 77
Tivnan, B. F. Optimizing United States Marine Corps Enlisted Assignments. Master's 
Thesis in Operations Research, Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1998. 
Yardley, R. J., P. Schirmer, H. J. Thie, and S. J. Merck. OPNAV N14 Quick Reference: 
Officer Manpower and Personnel Governance in the U.S. Navy. Primer, 
Arlington, VA: RAND Corporation, 2005. 
 78
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 79
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
3. Professor William Gates 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
4. Professor Stephen Mehay 
Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
5. CAPT Maureen Cahill 
HR Center of Excellence 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
6. CDR Craig Wevley 
Major Staff Placement (PERS 442) 
Navy Personnel Command 
Millington, TN 
 
7. Mr. Paul Soutter 
c/o Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N14) 
Washington, DC  
 
8. LCDR Loren Reinke 
c/o Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N100) 
Washington, DC  
 
9. Mr. Brad McNary 
c/o Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N100) 
Washington, DC  
 
10. LCDR David Clark 
c/o Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (N100) 
Washington, DC  
